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In nearly every moment of our lives, we make decisions. However, the neuronal 
mechanism underlying decision-making is still not clear. Currently, there is a debate on 
whether value-based decisions are based on the selection of goals or the selection of 
actions. We investigated this question by recording from the supplementary eye field 
(SEF) of monkeys during an oculomotor gambling task. We found that SEF neurons 
initially encode the option and action values associated with both task options. Later on, 
the competitive interactions between the different options result in their selection. 
Specifically, competition occurred in both action space and value space as represented in 
SEF. However, SEF encodes the chosen option 60~100 ms before the chosen action. 
When neuronal activity in SEF was reversibly inactivated, the monkeys’ selection of the 
less valuable option was significantly increased. These results suggest that SEF is 
actively engaged in value based decision-making by forming a map of the competing 
saccade targets. Activity within this map reflects the chosen option first, and then later 
the corresponding necessary action . This SEF population activity is causally related to 
the selection of a saccade based on subjective value, and reflects both the selection of 
goals and of actions. Moreover, in contrary to the two major decision hypothesis under 
the debate, our results suggest value based decision rely on the selection of both goals 
and actions. This study therefore supports a new cascade choice theory of value-based 
decision making in which the competition is present for both goals and actions. The early 





Advisor: Dr. Veit Stuphorn 





I would never be able to finish my dissertation without the guidance of my 
advisor, support from committee members, help from friends, and love from my family. 
During these five years, the thought of writing these acknowledgements was always on 
my mind, because of the constant help and encouragement I have been blessed with. Now 
that I have finally reached this point, I would like to express my sincerest appreciation to 
everyone who have supported and helped me during my Ph.D. study. 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Veit Stuphorn, for 
his superlative guidance, immense understanding, generous support, and considerate care 
in every little aspect. As an international student coming from an interdisciplinary 
background, it is really hard to imagine how I could have survived these years and 
completed my Ph.D. work without Veit's help. Whenever I was stuck with any kind of 
difficulties, Veit always had a brilliant solution waiting there to help me out. Whenever I 
was reading his comments on my work, I always had a strange mixture of feeling of 
gratitude (for the detailed attention to every sentence and point), exhilaration (for the 
always insightful ways to dramatically improve the argument to a new level) and regret 
(for not thinking about it beforehand). I am very lucky to have Veit as my mentor in my 
academic life. I've learned a lot from Veit, not only about how to be a good scientist, but 
also about how to be a good adviser to others (eventually). Wherever I go, I would 
always be proud of my "Stuphorn lab” badge. 
v 
 
I've been especially fortunate to have Dr. Susan Courtney, Dr. Peter Holland, and 
Dr. Steven Yantis on my thesis proposal/advance-examination committee. In the 
committee meeting, their challenging but always insightful questions inspired me to think 
from different angles and reminded me of the importance of the big picture. Outside the 
meetings, they have always been there for me whenever I needed assistance. I still vividly 
remember Peter’s extra guidance which had helped me immensely in my study about the 
reinforcement theory during my first year. It was Steve's advanced exam reading list that 
furthered my reading into the theories on attention, and led to my first encounter with my 
future advisor, Dr. Tirin Moore's work. It was Susan's timely help which allowed me to 
be better prepared my post-doc interview. Without her thoughtful suggestions, there 
would be no section 4.2.5 in this dissertation and other relevant discussions. Besides my 
committee members, I would also like to thank the wonderful faculty members in my 
department, especially Dr. Howard Egeth for his helpful suggestions during the human 
psychophysics work.  
I was also very lucky to become part of the Mind and Brain institute (MBI) in 
addition to the department of psychology and brain sciences (PBS). Because of this, I 
could always have double the happy hours, double the parties, and double the seminar 
dessert from both places. More importantly, I was extremely grateful that I could receive 
twice the help and support from both PBS and MBI. The faculty members from MBI are 
like my friends. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Dr. Steve Hsiao, Dr. 
Ed Corner, Dr. Ernst Niebur, Dr. Rudiger von der Heydt, Dr. James Kenierim, Dr. 
Steward Hendry, and Dr. Kristina Nielsen in so many different aspects. Especially, I 
would like to express my gratitude to Steve (Hsiao) who interviewed me with Veit before 
vi 
 
I came here, and helped me getting into the program allowing me to pursue my scientific 
dream here. There are not enough words in my English language to describe the people 
and their help which I want to thank here. 谁言寸草心，报得三春晖 (the little grass can 
hardly repay the kindness of the warm sun). All in all, I could not have achieved what I 
have now without the help from any one of them. 
I would also like to thank my friends from the lab, Dennis Sasikumar, Katie 
Scangos, Nayoung So, Eric Emeric, Jaewon Hwang, Kitty Xu, William Vinje and Xinjian 
Li. Besides the tremendous help to my researches, they are also kind friends whom I can 
always count on to join me in our breaks from the long work. As Dennis said, "No one 
gets to select who their co-workers are going to be, but I don't think it would worked 
better that had I picked all of you myself." I would also like to acknowledge the 
cooperation of my non-human friends from the lab, Aragorn and Isildur. Without their 
high intelligence and devotedness to the work, I could not have completed this 
dissertation work. 
I could not have enjoyed my graduate study here without my dearest friends. I am 
so grateful to my great friends Yi-shin Sheu, Zheng Ma, Jenny Wang, Heeyeon Im, 
Steven Chang, et al from PBS and Stefan Mihalas, Eric Carlson, Ann Martin, Jonathan 
Williford, Sachin Deshmukh,  Fancesco Savelli, et al from MBI for accompanying me 
during these wonderful five years here at Hopkins. We had a lot of fun memories together 
such as going to class, suffering from exams, partying, eating out, hiking, et al. People 
always say "your friend define you". I am really glad we could know each other here and 
be friends. I also thank many members of the MBI family, Bill Quinlan, Bill Nash, Susan 
Soohoo, Eric Potter, Charles Meyer, Debbie Kelly, Brance Amussen, Lei Hao. Besides 
vii 
 
their technical supports, their warm-hearted friendliness always made me feel not far 
away from home.  In addition, I would like to take this opportunity to thank some of my 
friends outside my work, such as my loyal roommate (Alyssa Toda), my dearest cello 
tutor (Bai-Chi Chen) and cello mates (Carla Harrision, Susan Tobias and Lydia Zieglar) 
and my tennis partners.  
At last, but not least, I would like to thank my family members. I am forever in 
debt and gratitude to my beloved mother (Jianhua Yuan) and father (Jiansheng Chen), 
who instilled the love of science and knowledge in me from early on; who always give 
me their shoulder whenever I feel tired or frustrated; and who devote all their love and 
wisdoms to raise me up to more than I could be. I'd like to thank my cousin, Cheng Wang, 
who always feels like a little brother to me. Finally, I should thank my husband, Kunlun 




Table of Contents 
Abstract                                                                                                                              ii 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                           iv 
List of Figures                                                                                                                 xiii 
List of Tables                                                                                                                    xv 
1. Introduction                                                                                                            1 
1.1 Value based decision-making ......................................................................1 
1.1.1 Good-based hypothesis .......................................................................2 
1.1.2 Action-based hypothesis .....................................................................3 
1.2 Supplementary eye field ..............................................................................4 
1.3 Thesis overview ...........................................................................................8 
2. A human pilot study ---mechanisms underlying the influence of saliency on 
value-based decisions                                                                                           10 
2.1 Method .......................................................................................................14 
2.1.1 Subjects .............................................................................................14 
2.1.2 Pilot Experiments ..............................................................................14 
2.1.3 Stimuli ...............................................................................................16 
2.1.4 Main experiment ...............................................................................18 
2.2 Results ........................................................................................................20 
ix 
 
2.2.1 Influence of value on reaction time ...................................................20 
2.2.2 Influence of salience on reaction time ...............................................23 
2.2.3 Error trials .........................................................................................26 
2.2.4 Descriptive model of behavior ..........................................................29 
2.2.5 Accumulator models .........................................................................33 
2.2.6 Mutual inhibition is necessary to explain behavior ...........................38 
2.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................48 
2.3.1 Onset time differences .......................................................................49 
2.3.2 Functional architecture of value-based decision-making in primates51 
 3. General Methods                                                                                                  55 
3.1 Experimental Set-Up and Surgery .............................................................55 
3.2 Behavior Paradigm -- a gambling task.......................................................56 
3.3 Estimation of subjective value ...................................................................59 
3.4 Electrophysiology recording ......................................................................59 
3.4.1 Single unit recording .........................................................................59 
3.4.2 Cortical location ................................................................................60 
3.5 Neurophysiology data analysis ..................................................................62 
3.5.1 Spike density functions .....................................................................62 
3.5.2 Task-related neurons .........................................................................62 
4. Competition between Choice Options                                                                65 
x 
 
4.1 Specific Methods .......................................................................................65 
4.1.1 Population analysis ............................................................................65 
4.1.2 Leaky integrator model .....................................................................66 
4.2 Results ........................................................................................................67 
4.2.1 Subjects' choice behavior in the gamble task ....................................67 
4.2.2 Non-divisive normalized firing pattern in SEF .................................69 
4.2.3 Competition between value of the choice options.............................71 
4.2.5 Competition between direction of the choice options .......................74 
4.2.6 The competition between two options in action value map in SEF ..77 
4.2.7 The onset manipulation of the competition process ..........................82 
4.2.8 Simulation of neurophysiologic data .................................................85 
4.3 Discussion ..................................................................................................87 
4.3.1 Non divisive normalization in SEF ...................................................87 
4.3.2 Competition between two choice options in SEF .............................87 
5. Cascade Process between Value and Direction Representation                                  
1                                                                                                                              90 
5.1 Specific Methods .......................................................................................90 
5.1.1 Classification analysis .......................................................................90 
5.1.2 Mutual information analysis ..............................................................91 
5.1.3 Regression analysis ...........................................................................93 
xi 
 
5.2 Results ........................................................................................................95 
5.2.1 Temporal sequence between chosen value and chosen direction .....95 
5.2.2 Mutual value and direction information ............................................97 
5.3 Competition process in both value representation and direction 
representation in SEF ...............................................................................100 
5.4 Discussion ................................................................................................101 
6. Causal Relation between SEF and Value based Choice Behavior                104 
6.1 Specific Methods .....................................................................................104 
6.1.1 The cryogenic deactivation .............................................................104 
6.1.2 Time frequency analysis ..................................................................107 
6.1.3 The new target gamble task .............................................................108 
6.2 Results ......................................................................................................109 
6.2.1 Neuronal response to cool temperature: Action potentials .............109 
6.2.2 Neuronal response to cool temperature: Local field potential ........112 
6.2.3 The effect of SEF deactivation on choice probability .....................114 
6.2.4 Unilateral deactivation ....................................................................116 
6.3 Discussion ................................................................................................117 
6.3.1 Dissociation between action potential and LFP ..............................117 
6.3.2 Causal role of SEF in value based decision-making .......................119 
7. General Discussion                                                                                             123 
xii 
 
7.1 Comparison between different value based decision- making hypotheses123 
7.2 The functional role of SEF in value based decision- making ---executive 
control of saccade selection .....................................................................126 
7.3 Concluding remarks .................................................................................128 
Bibliography                                                                                                        130 





List of Figures 
Figure 2.1    Behavioral paradigm.   ....................................................................................15
Figure 2.2 Effect of saturation level on reaction time and error rate for different color 
targets.   ................................................................................................................................17
Figure 2.3 Effect of chosen value on reaction time.   ..........................................................21
Figure 2.4 Mean reaction time modulated by both salience and value.   .............................24
Figure 2.5 Error rates and mean reaction times on different trial types.   ...........................27
Figure 2.6 Cumulative reaction time distributions.   ...........................................................28
Figure 2.7 Mean reaction times  for both second pilot and main experiment.   ..................30
Figure 2.8 Architecture of the four accumulator models.   ..................................................34
Figure 2.9 Examples of the time evolution of variables in independent models in 
incongruent trials.   ..............................................................................................................36
Figure 2.10 Predictions of Model 1 (independent model).   ................................................40
Figure 2.11 Predictions of Model 2 (speed model).  ...........................................................42
Figure 2.12 Predictions of Model 3 (onset model).   ...........................................................43
Figure 2.13 Effect of difference in the onset time of accumulation in Model 3 (onset 
model).   ...............................................................................................................................46
Figure 2.14 Predictions of Model 4 (full model).   ..............................................................47
Figure 3.1 Gambling task.   ..................................................................................................57
Figure 3.2  Recording locations in SEF.   ............................................................................61
Figure 4.1  Behavior results for both monkeys .   ................................................................68
Figure 4.2 Comparison of neuronal activity in choice and no-choice trials.   .....................70
xiv 
 
Figure 4.3 An representative neuron showing different degrees of chosen and non-chosen 
values aligning on target onset and movement onset .  .......................................................72
Figure 4.4 Average neuronal activity across 128 neurons representing different degrees of 
chosen and non-chosen values.   ..........................................................................................75
Figure 4.5  Directional effect.   ............................................................................................76
Figure 4.6 Time-direction maps showing population activity in SEF.   ..............................79
Figure 4.7 Time-direction maps for comparison between correct and error trials.   ...........80
Figure 4.8 SEF activity in onset difference trials.   .............................................................83
Figure 4.9  Simulation results.   ...........................................................................................86
Figure 5.1 Temporal sequence between value and direction information.   ........................96
Figure 5.2 Neuronal dynamics within a neuronal state space and results of SVM 
classifier.   ............................................................................................................................98
Figure 6.1 The cryogenic deactivation.  ............................................................................106
Figure 6.2 A representative cooling section.   ...................................................................110
Figure 6.3 Neuronal activity as a function of temperature above the dura and depth of 
recording.   .........................................................................................................................111
Figure 6.4 Comparison of LFP energy distribution in normal and cooling conditions.   ..113
Figure 6.5 Choice probability affected by cooling.   .........................................................115





List of Tables 
Table 2.1  BIC table for descriptive behavior regression model.   ......................................32
Table 2.2 Fitness of four different models in fitting reaction time on choice trials and 






















Chapter 1  
Introduction 
In nearly every moment of our lives, we make decisions. However only till very 
recently, have we begun to investigate the neuronal mechanism of decision-making (Gold 
and Shadlen, 2007). Value based decision- making requires the ability to select both the 
reward option with the highest available value and the appropriate action necessary to 
obtain the desired option. The neuronal mechanisms underlying these processes are still 
not well understood. 
1.1 Value based decision-making 
Neurophysiological understanding of decision- making was pioneered by studies 
on perceptual decision- making (Britten et al., 1992; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996, 2001; 
Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 2011) . Recently, value based decision-making, in which the 
decisions are based primarily on the subjective value associated with each of the possible 
alternatives, has become the focus of the nascent field of neuroeconomics (Glimcher, 
2005; Kable and Glimcher, 2009). While perceptual decision- making depends more on 
the representation of the external state such as the visual stimuli, value based decision- 
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making is more driven by the desirability of the object which depends on the internal 
state. 
A network of cortical areas has been identified participating in value based 
decision- making (Sugrue et al., 2005; Gold and Shadlen, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008; 
Kable and Glimcher, 2009; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). Neurobiological correlates of value 
have been described in orbitofrontal cortex (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006), amygdala 
(Nishijo et al., 1988a, b; Paton et al., 2006), as well as other cortical areas traditionally 
associated with reward-seeking behavior. The value signals from those areas have been 
found in relation to the obtained reward option itself, but do not reflect the motor actions 
required to obtain it. On the other hand, the motor related cortical areas have been 
identified decades ago (Tehovnik et al., 2000; Lynch and Tian, 2006), which include 
superior colliculus (SC), lateral inferior parietal cortex (LIP),  and frontal eye field  (FEF) 
(Bizzi, 1967; Bizzi and Schiller, 1970; Goldberg and Bushnell, 1981; Bruce and 
Goldberg, 1985). These cortical areas are dominated by movement information (Leon 
and Shadlen, 1999). Where the decision is made and how value representations 
participate in action selection are still under debate. Currently, there are two major 
hypotheses for this process.  
1.1.1 Good-based hypothesis 
The good-based hypothesis (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011) suggests that the decision is 
made in a goods space. It is consistent with the economic theories arguing that human 
make decisions between options regarding different goods by integrating all relevant 
factors (gains, risk, cost, et al) into a single variable capturing the subjective value of 
each option. Neurophysiological studies  have found such subjective value activity in the 
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obitofrontal (OFC) (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006, 2008; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009) and 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Wallis, 2007; Kennerley and Walton, 2011; 
Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). In particular, neural activity in OFC correlates with the value of 
each single option independent of other options (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2008), and 
adjusts its gain to reflect the full range of values presented in a given block of trials 
(Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). This hypothesis satisfies the normal intuition about decision-
making. For example, when choosing between an apple and a banana, we would think 
about the apple rather than how to move our hands when making the decisions. This 
hypothesis also follows the classic tradition of cognitive psychology, in which the 
cognitive system responsible for decisions is separate from the sensorimotor systems that 
implement its commands (Pylyshyn, 1984). This theory in its purest form would predict 
that motor areas should only represent the motor plan of the chosen option. 
1.1.2 Action-based hypothesis 
Action-based hypothesis (Cisek, 2006, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010) suggests 
that decisions are made through a biased competition between action representations. In 
this hypothesis, the subjective value is still important, but these signals are not directly 
compared in the abstract space of goods. Instead, they together with other factors such as 
action costs cause bias influence on a competition that take place within a representation 
of potential actions. Current findings in perceptual decision- making have supported this 
hypothesis (Shadlen and Newsome, 2001; Gold and Shadlen, 2007). The neuronal 
activity in LIP (Shadlen and Newsome, 1996, 2001), SC (Horwitz and Newsome, 1999, 
2001), FEF (Hanes and Schall, 1996), dLPFC (Kim and Shadlen, 1999), and basal 
ganglia (Ding and Gold, 2013) act as accumulators, in which different actions competes 
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with each other by accumulating evidence supporting certain action as described in the  
accumulator model. This hypothesis can also be supported by the perturbation experiment 
in which inactivation of deeper layer of SC (McPeek and Keller, 2004) or sub-threshold 
SC micro-stimulation (Carello and Krauzlis, 2004) influence monkeys choice behavior 
rather than simple motor control. This theory in its purest form predicts that chosen value 
should not exist before an action is chosen, since the competition in the action space is 
the only precursor to the decision. 
Both good-based hypothesis and action-based hypothesis are based on the 
neurophysiology recordings in different cortical areas where either value or action is 
coded. But none of them have taken into account of the recording in the association areas 
where action value has been founded. In order to investigate the "elephant" from a 
different angle, we decided to record in one of the association areas (supplementary eye 
field, SEF) to see how value can participate or help with action selection in value based 
decision-making. 
1.2 Supplementary eye field 
We used an ocular motor task in the study of this decision-making problem. The 
first work on saccadic cortical region can be traced back to Ferrier (Ferrier, 1875, 1886). 
The experiments were done by electrically stimulating exposed cortex of anesthetized 
monkeys. Nowadays, the cortical regions identified contributing to the eye movement 
include the frontal eye field (FEF), the parietal eye field (PEF) which is located in the 
lateral bank of the intraparietal sulcus (LIP), the supplementary eye field (SEF) which is 
part of the dorsal medial frontal cortex (DMFC), the medial superior temporal area 
(MST), the prefrontal eye field region (PFEF or dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex, DLPFC), 
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and a region on the medial surface of the parietal lobe called the precuneus region in 
human imaging studies and area 7m in monkey studies (Tehovnik et al., 2000; Lynch and 
Tian, 2006). 
 SEF was first described by Schlag and Schlag-Ray (Schlag and Schlag-Rey, 1985, 
1987) as a region in the dorsomedial frontal cortex in which neurons discharge before 
saccadic eye movements. The identification of this area was motivated by the observation 
of eye movement-representing area in the dorsal bank of the cingulate sulcus, which was 
found while mapping the supplementary motor areas (SMA) (Woolsey et al., 1952). This 
area is located rostral to the SMA and lateral to the pre-SMA. Previous studies showed 
that the neurons in SEF discharge during saccadic movement (Bruce et al., 1985; Mann et 
al., 1988; Schall, 1991; Bon and Lucchetti, 1992), active fixation (Bon and Lucchetti, 
1990; Lee and Tehovnik, 1995),  onset of visual stimuli (Schlag and Schlag-Rey, 1987; 
Schall, 1991; Russo and Bruce, 1996), smooth pursuit eye movement (Heinen, 1995; 
Heinen and Liu, 1997), and hand-eye coordination (Mushiake et al., 1996).  
Despite its similarity to other oculomotor areas, SEF also demonstrates many 
differences especially in regard to its contribution to internal guided saccades. In the first 
study of SEF, Schlag and Schlag-Rey (Schlag and Schlag-Rey, 1987) noted that unlike 
FEF, SEF showed activity prior to spontaneous exploratory saccades. In addition, SEF 
showed longer latency in response to electrical stimulation, suggesting that SEF is more 
remote along the final common pathway compared to FEF. Based on those observations, 
the authors suggested that the two eye fields have different roles of visually guided (FEF) 
and internally guided (SEF) saccades. Chen and Wise (Chen and Wise, 1995) found that 
SEF is involved in oculomotor learning where the neurons were most active during the 
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learning of new and arbitrary stimulus-saccade associations. In addition, in anti-saccade 
experiment, the pre-saccadic activity of SEF neurons was highly predictive of successful 
anti-saccades, showing higher activity in anti-saccade trials than in pro-saccade trials 
with the same saccade metric (Schlag-Rey et al., 1997; Amador et al., 1998, 2004).  It 
was also reported that SEF neurons detect and predict reinforcements (Amador et al., 
2000; Stuphorn et al., 2000a; Coe et al., 2002; So and Stuphorn, 2012). In the 
countermanding task, SEF neurons showed error- and conflict- monitoring activity 
(Stuphorn et al., 2000b). However, unlike neurons in FEF and SC, the neurons in SEF 
were not sufficient to initiate eye movement in visually guided saccades (Stuphorn et al., 
2000b; Stuphorn et al., 2010). 
The idea of SEF involved in the control of internally guided saccades can be also 
supported by perturbation experiments which test the causal relation between the 
neuronal activity and the behavior. Electrical stimulation of the SEF produced saccades 
that take the eyes to a particular orbital position ("goal-directed saccades"), and 
prolonged stimulation kept the eyes at that positions. While stimulation of the FEF 
elicited saccades that had specific direction and amplitudes, prolonged electrical 
stimulation yielded a staircase of identical saccades with intervening fixation (Tehovnik 
and Lee, 1993; Tehovnik, 1995). Moreover, the behavioral state of animals has a much 
greater effect on saccadic eye movements evoked electrically from SEF than from FEF 
(Tehovnik et al., 1999).  In the experiment, monkeys were required to fixate the visual 
target for 600 ms after which a juice reward was given. When stimulating the SEF early 
during the fixation period, 16 times as much current was required to evoke saccades than 
when current was delivered after termination of the fixation spot. During countermanding 
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task in which SEF showed error and monitor signal (Stuphorn et al., 2000a),  electrical 
micro-stimulation to SEF neurons improved the monkeys’ performances (Stuphorn and 
Schall, 2006). Lesion and reversible inactivation study on SEF showed mild but 
significant deficits in temporal discrimination task. In the visual guided task, DMFC 
lesion produced a mild impairment on the contralateral side which recovered within 
weeks. FEF lesions produced a much more dramatic deficit on the task that lasted for 2 
years of continued testing (Schiller and Chou, 1998). Human patients with SEF lesions 
showed impairment in sequence of memory-guided saccades, while there were no 
impairment in visually guided or single memory-guided saccades (Gaymard et al., 1990). 
Consistent with the idea that SEF is involved in internal guided saccade, the 
design of this dissertation study was based on the hypothesis of SEF’s participation in the 
process of value based decision-making in the case of eye movements. As discussed 
above, value based decision depends on the internal representation of desirability as well 
as selectivity, and is an internal guided process.  SEF has appropriate anatomical 
connection for such a role because it sits in the association area linking the option value 
coding cortical areas to the motor related areas. It receives input from orbitofrontal cortex 
and the amygdala (Huerta and Kaas, 1990; Ghashghaei et al., 2007). In addition, SEF 
also forms a cortico-basal ganglia loop with the caudate nucleus, superior temporal 
polysensory (STP) area and the nuclei in the central thalamus that are innervated by 
superior colliculus (SC) and substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNpr). Caudate nucleus, as 
part of this cortico-basal ganglia loop, has already been known to contain saccadic action-
value signals (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). Moreover, SEF has reciprocal connections with 
oculomotor cortical areas, such as FEF, LIP, and 7A (Huerta and Kaas, 1990), which can 
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modulate the neuronal activity in the motor area. Previous recording found that neurons 
in SEF became active before value based saccades much earlier than neurons in FEF and 
LIP (Coe et al., 2002). A previous research in the lab has found reward options and of 
saccadic actions in stimulus driven saccades (So and Stuphorn, 2011). However, whether 
this neuronal activity participates in the ongoing value based decision process is still 
unknown. It could either represent the decision variables used in the decision process 
itself, or merely reflect the downstream outcome of the decision. 
1.3 Thesis overview 
We investigated whether and how SEF participate in value based decision- 
making through an integrated application of physiological recording, and perturbation 
techniques. In addition to non-primate neurophysiology recording, we also carried out a 
human psychophysics pilot study to test the experiment paradigm before the 
physiological recording (Chapter2). Although the human psychophysics experiment 
design is not identical to the one used in the monkey study, it advanced our understanding 
of how visual salience can influence value-based choice behavior through modifying 
value representation. In the main experiment, we designed a gamble task in which 
monkeys had to choose between two options by making an eye movement to the desired 
option (Chapter 3). This decision task allowed us to investigate the neuronal activity in 
terms of both value representation and direction representation. We found that population 
neuronal activity in SEF represented both chosen and non-chosen option in a competitive 
way (Chapter 4), which argues against the value based hypothesis in its pure form. 
Moreover, our results support a sequential process between value and direction 
representation, whereby the chosen option is selected first, and then biases the action 
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selection process (Chapter 5). This result argues against action-based hypothesis in its 
pure form. Our neurophysiologic results therefore support a new cascade hypothesis of 
decision- making which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 and Chapter 7. Consistent 
with these neural recording results, reversible inactivation of SEF produced a larger error 
rate and noisier choice behavior (Chapter 6). These results further suggest that SEF 
causally contributes to the value based decision process. The dissertation will close with a 
conclusion, proposing a possible parallel decision- making process in both value and 






Chapter 2  
A human pilot study ---mechanisms 
underlying the influence of saliency on 
value-based decisions  
This chapter will describe a behavioral study in humans, which was conducted 
before the physiological recording as a pilot study. Though the human psychophysics 
experiment design was not eventually used in the monkey study because of technical 
issues, the result suggest an interesting way of how visual salience can influence value-
based choice behavior through modulating value representation and motor competition. 
Value-based decision- making is the selection of an action among several 
alternatives based on the subjective value of their outcomes. While ideally this choice 
should be independent of irrelevant target properties, it is well-known that low level 
physical properties can profoundly influence decision-making. During free viewing of 
natural scenes and video sequences, saccades are drawn to more salient parts of an image 
(Parkhurst et al., 2002; Parkhurst and Niebur, 2003; Berg et al., 2009), observers find 
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these parts more interesting (Masciocchi et al., 2009), and high salience targets are 
detected faster and more accurately (Egeth and Yantis, 1997; Wolfe, 1998). The question 
thus arises whether visual salience influences not only simple perceptual but also value-
based decisions. 
A number of recent studies demonstrated that both visual salience and subjective 
value can affect decision- making (Navalpakkam et al., 2010; Markowitz et al., 2011; 
Schutz et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the mechanisms underlying this behavioral 
phenomenon might differ depending on the specific influence of salience in the task. 
Sensory stimuli can vary in many different feature dimensions and any of these feature 
domains can influence the overall salience of the target. However, value information is 
typically carried only by some of the features of a visual target. It is therefore of 
importance, whether salience is manipulated on the same or a different feature dimension 
as value. 
In a situation, in which salience is manipulated on a different feature dimension 
than the one indicating value, the main effect of salience manipulations will be to 
influence the overall contrast of the target relative to the background and other targets. In 
other words, low salience will lead to a lower probability that the target will be detected 
to be present.  However, once detected a low salience target will provide as much 
information about its value as a high salience target. Such salience manipulations were 
often employed in previous research, either by modulating detectability of targets 
(Markowitz et al., 2011) or of distractors (Navalpakkam et al., 2010). This generates a 
‘neglect’ situation, in which high value targets can be overlooked, if they are of lower 
salience than the background or alternatives.  
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The situation is different when the salience of the feature dimension is 
manipulated that carries value information, but other feature dimensions of the target are 
still highly salient. In this situation, the perception of the value information is selectively 
influenced by the salience manipulation, while all the other perceptual dimensions are the 
same. The influence of the salience manipulation on choice behavior is therefore not 
simply to make the agent unaware of a low salience target, but rather to create targets 
whose value is harder to perceive. There are fewer studies of this type (Schutz et al., 
2012) and as a result we know much less about the influence of salience on value-related 
information. 
In this study, we designed therefore a two alternative forced choice task, in which 
items in a visual display were endowed with different values (rewards). Human 
participants rapidly chose between items, attempting to maximize the reward amount.  
We manipulated visual salience and value of the targets simultaneously and 
independently across trials, while keeping the detectability of all targets constant. That is, 
we designed visual stimuli, for which one visual feature (luminance contrast with the 
background) was large enough to ensure that their location could be detected rapidly. 
Another visual feature (color saturation) was manipulated so that the visual feature 
carrying value information (color hue) was more or less perceptually salient. Therefore, 
the manipulation of salience influences the perception of value. The salience is with 
respect to behaviorally relevant information (i.e. target value), but not with respect to the 
ability of the subject to localize the targets on the screen.  In this way we could 
manipulate the visual salience of value information without directly affecting motor 
processes used to report the choice. We also mixed no-choice trials in with the choice 
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trials, in which subjects could only select the single target on the screen. The no-choice 
trials were controls to test the effect of visual salience and value on behavior without any 
interference by the choice process.   
We found that both value and salience have strong effects on the decision process 
by themselves, as has congruency between value and salience. Specifically, reaction 
times were significantly correlated with both value and salience of the chosen target, and 
with value difference and salience difference between the chosen target and the non-
chosen target. In addition, the error rate, defined as the rate of choosing the lower valued 
target, was significantly higher in incongruent trials than in any other type of trials. 
After characterizing behavior in a descriptive regression model, we analyzed the 
neuronal mechanisms underlying our behavioral data using a series of four stochastic 
accumulator models based on different functional assumptions (Bogacz et al., 2006; 
Cisek et al., 2009; Purcell et al., 2010; Hanks et al., 2011; Krajbich and Rangel, 2011). 
All models consist of two accumulators, each adding up value information in support of 
one of the two possible choices. For the “independent model”, we assumed that the two 
accumulators did not interact, while the other accumulator models implemented mutual 
inhibition between them.  The “speed model” assumed that salience influenced the rate 
with which value information was accumulated by modulating the strength of the 
incoming value information. The “onset model” was motivated by the observation that 
salience can reduce visual processing time (Ratcliff and Smith, 2011; White and Munoz, 
2011) and assumed an earlier accumulation onset time rather than an increased 
accumulation rate. The full model combined both ways for salience to affect the 
accumulation process. Comparison between model predictions and behavior suggested 
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that mutual inhibition and salience-induced differences in accumulation onset time, but 
not accumulation rate, are necessary to explain the behavior of the human participants. 
2.1 Method 
2.1.1 Subjects 
Fifteen participants (Age: 18-30, eight female) undergraduate and graduate 
students naïve to the purpose of the study, were recruited from the Johns Hopkins 
University community and participated in the experiment after providing informed 
consent. All participants reported normal or corrected-to normal vision and no history of 
color blindness. Among these 15 participants, 9 (Age: 26-30, five females) participated in 
the two pilot experiments, 9 (Age: 18-30, five females) participated in the main 
experiment, and 3 participated in all three experiments. All procedures were approved by 
the Johns Hopkins University Homewood Institutional Review Board. 
2.1.2 Pilot Experiments  
In the first pilot experiment, we determined saturation levels to be used in the 
main experiment based on simple color detection. Four targets with equal brightness 
appeared on the screen, of which one was colored and the others were gray.  The 
participants were required to localize the colored target and to indicate its position by 
pressing the corresponding key on a keyboard.  In order to encourage accuracy, we did 
not set a response deadline. We tested all five colors (cyan, brown, green, blue, yellow) 
used in the main experiment (Figure 2.1) in a range (1%-16%) of saturation levels. In the 
pilot experiment, the color of the targets in the detection experiment did not carry any 
value information and we did not observe systematic behavioral differences across colors  
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Figure 2.1    Behavioral paradigm. A: Sequence of events during no-choice trials (top) 
and choice trials (bottom). The type of stimulus is listed to the right. The black arrow is 
not part of the stimuli; it symbolizes the participants' choices which then lead to the next 
stimulus shown. In all cases shown, the arrow corresponds to the optimal choice.  B: 
Visual cues used. High and low salience targets are left and right, respectively. Rows 




(Figure 2.2).  In contrast, mean reaction time varied systematically with the saturation 
level, which for our purposes served as a measure for the salience of a target. Low 
saturation levels were defined as in the 3-5% range because the reaction times in response 
to these targets were around 50 ms longer than those in response to high saturation 
targets, defined as 16% where performance plateaued. Accuracy was nearly perfect for all 
values above 6% (with one outlier).  Thus, low saturation level was chosen for each color 
(5% for yellow, 4% for cyan, brown and green, and 3% for blue), so that the salience of 
the color information was substantially reduced from high saturation level (16% for all 
colors), but still strong enough to be detectable. 
In order to test, whether the manipulation of the color saturation by itself had an  
effect on the speed with which the targets could be detected, we performed a second pilot 
experiment (the singleton task) with nine participants (results shown in Figures 2.4 and 
2.7). In this task, 10 targets with different color or saturation as selected in the pilot 
experiment were used. There was no difference in value associated with the targets.  
In each trial, only one target appeared on the screen and the participants were 
asked to indicate its location by pressing the corresponding key. They were encouraged to 
do so as fast as possible while maintaining accuracy. The task made sure the detectability 
of all the targets was the same. 
2.1.3 Stimuli 
In the main experiment, the value associated with a particular target was indicated 
by its color. The color properties of the targets were derived from the hue (H∈[0°,360°)), 
saturation (S∈[0,1]) and brightness (V∈[0,1]) color space. In this space, hue is the 




Figure 2.2 Effect of saturation level on reaction time and error rate for different 
color targets. The mean reaction times and error rates for nine subjects are plotted. The 
colors of the lines in the plots correspond to the colors of the targets used in the task. A: 
Mean reaction times plotted as a function of the saturation level. Error bars represent 
standard error of the mean reaction time. B: Error rates plotted as a function of the 
saturation level. Error bars represent standard error of error rate.  
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perceived colors; saturation is the colorfulness of a stimulus relative to its own 
brightness; and brightness is the attribute of a visual sensation according to which an area 
appears to emit more or less light. Five different colors indicated five different values that 
could be earned (“cyan”, hue 180°: 0 points;“brown”, 30°: 10 points; “green”, 90°: 20 
points; “blue”, 240°: 40 points; “yellow”, 60°: 80 points) (Figure 2.1B). The targets were 
approximately 1.5×1.5° in size and were always presented approximately 20° away from 
the central fixation point at angles 45°, 135°, 225° or 315° relative to the horizontal. The 
background was approximately 16×22cm in size and was uniformly gray and the 
brightness of each target exceeded that of the background by 4%. Since the targets had all 
the same brightness, the participants had to rely on color information alone to determine 
the relative value of each target. We manipulated the salience of this reward-related 
information by modulating color saturation independently of target value, as determined 
in the first pilot experiment. As discussed, the selection of high and low saturation levels 
for each hue was guided by the psychophysical data in the second pilot study. 
2.1.4 Main experiment 
At the start of the main experiment, participants received instructions on the 
nature of the task. They were informed that they would have the opportunity to earn 
“points” which accumulated over trials, and they were encouraged to maximize the 
number of points earned. 
Participants then were presented with targets on a computer monitor (Figure 
2.1A) in front of them that varied in value and salience. The task consisted of two types 
of trials: choice and no-choice trials. At the beginning of each trial, the participants were 
required to fixate the fixation point for 1500 ms. In choice trials, after the fixation point 
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disappeared, two targets appeared in diagonally opposite locations on the screen. 
Participants chose a target by pressing a key on the keypad (Insert: left up; Delete: left 
down; Home: right up; End: right down; the relative locations of these keys on the 
keypad agree with the locations of the corresponding stimuli on the screen) that 
corresponded to the location of the desired option. Pressing any key other than these four 
was considered an invalid choice.  No-choice trials were used as controls to test the 
influence of both salience and value without interference by choice. In no-choice trials, 
only one target appeared on the screen and participants had to press the key that 
corresponded to the target location.  Pressing one of the other three keys was considered 
an error.  The response deadline (2000 ms) was chosen generously to encourage 
participants to take as much time as necessary to choose the appropriate target. Following 
a valid key press, the amount of points associated with the chosen target and the non-
chosen target were revealed on the monitor. Otherwise, no points were revealed, the next 
trial started after an inter-trial interval whose length was selected randomly (uniform 
distribution) from the range 1000-1500ms. 
Six comparisons were selected from the set of possible value differences between 
the two stimuli: 0 vs.  10 points, 0 vs. 20 points, 10 vs. 20 points, 20 vs. 40 points, 20 vs. 
80 points, and 40 vs. 80 points.  Each of these pairs was presented with equal frequency. 
These comparisons were selected so that across different trial types targets with medium 
values (10, 20, 40 points) had equal probability to be either larger or smaller in value than 
the alternative target. In addition, this set included comparisons with smaller and larger 
value differences.  For each value comparison, there were four different salience-value 
combinations (Figure 2.1A): In low salience trials, both targets were of low salience.  In 
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high salience trials, both targets were of high salience. In congruent trials, the high value 
target was of high salience, while the low value target was of low salience. Finally, in 
incongruent trials, the high value target was of low salience and the low value was of 
high salience. This resulted in 24 different combinations of choice trials (6 value 
comparisons × 4 value-salience combinations). Together with 10 different types of no-
choice trials (5 values x 2 salience levels), there were 34 different trial types that formed 
one block of trials. The trials were presented in blocks, so that a trial of a particular type 
was not presented again until the next block. Within a block, the order of trials was 
randomized. 
Participants were initially trained with high salience (32% saturation level) no-
choice and choice trials. After they achieved an accuracy of 90%, the main experiment 
began. Each participant performed the same number of trials, 11 blocks with 34 trials 
each, 374 trials total. 
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Influence of value on reaction time 
Our behavioral results showed a significant effect of the chosen target value on 
reaction times in correct trials. The mean reaction time during both no-choice and choice 
trials reflected the value of the chosen target. For all types of choice trials, reaction time 
was significantly correlated with the chosen target value; high salience (t-test, df=34, 
p<10-9), low salience (t-test, df=34, p<10-10), congruent (t-test, df=34, p<10-8), and 
incongruent (t-test, df=34, p<10-6) (Figure 2.3). The correlation coefficients were 
significantly smaller than zero as tested by the t-test in all cases; the larger the chosen 




Figure 2.3 Effect of chosen value on reaction time. The mean reaction times for all 
participants are plotted against the value of the chosen targets in (A) no-choice high 
salience trials, (B) no-choice low salience trials, (C) high salience trials, (D) low salience 
trials, (E) congruent trials and (F) incongruent trials. Each circle shows the mean reaction 





drive of the chosen target value on the speed of decision- making and response execution 
processes. Interestingly, the relative importance of this motivational drive was weaker on 
no-choice trials than on choice trials (slope of no-choice trials: high salience: -0.78 
ms/point,  low salience: -1.6 ms/point; slope of choice trials: high salience: -4.82 
ms/point, low salience: -5.19 ms/point, congruent: -4.33 ms/point, incongruent: -4.25 
ms/point), and in no-choice trials, the correlation between value and reaction time was 
significant only for low salience (t-test, df=43, p=0.03), but not high salience trials (t-test, 
df=43, p = 0.1) (Figure 2.3). 
Not only had the absolute value of the chosen target a significant effect on 
reaction time, but also the difference between chosen and non-chosen target. In our 
experimental design, we used only six out of the full set of all possible value 
combinations. Within this subset of choices, the value of the chosen target (i.e. the target 
with the higher value) was positively correlated with the value difference between chosen 
and non-chosen target. Therefore, we could not use a simple regression analysis to test 
whether the reaction time were correlated with value differences independent of chosen 
value. Nevertheless, a partial correlation analysis showed that, when we controlled for the 
contribution of the chosen value, the reaction time was still significantly correlated with 
the value difference between the chosen and the non-chosen target in all choice trials 
(Spearman partial correlations; high salience trials: df=42, p<10-4, low salience trials:  
df=42, p=0.015, congruent trials: df=42, p=0.016, incongruent trials: df=42, p=0.002). 
This relationship was also negative (slope high salience trials: -0.57 ms/point, low 
salience trials: -0.33 ms/point, congruent: -0.33 ms/point, incongruent: -0.42 ms/point): 
the larger the value difference, the shorter the reaction time. This finding supports the 
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view that participants compared the values of both targets before making a choice. Larger 
value differences made it easier to discriminate the more valuable target and resulted in 
faster responses, while smaller differences decreased the discriminability and required 
more time to select the correct response.   
 
2.2.2 Influence of salience on reaction time 
The salience of the reward information, i.e., the color saturation level of the 
targets, had a significant influence on reaction times when compared to the singleton task, 
the second pilot experiment (Figure 2.4).  In the singleton task, the reaction time for high 
salience targets (high salience singleton, mean: 467 ms) was identical to that for low 
salience targets (low salience singleton, mean: 467 ms) and much faster than the reaction 
time in no-choice trials. On the other hand, in no-choice trials when there was no 
interference between salience and value, the reaction time for high salience trials (mean: 
638 ms) was significantly faster (Kolmogorov–Smirnov (K-S) test, p <10-10) than for low 
salience trials (mean: 726 ms).  
At first sight, the large latency difference between singleton and no-choice trials is 
surprising, since the only difference between the two trial types is that color is 
behaviorally meaningful in one (no-choice), but not the other (singleton). However, this 
difference likely reflects a simple speed-accuracy trade-off caused by contextual 
differences in task demands. In the singleton task, the subjects could be sure that on any 
given trial there was only one target on the screen. The task was in essence to detect the 
changing location of the target as fast as possible. For this purpose, luminance contrast 
provided sufficient information, while target color could be safely ignored.  In this 




Figure 2.4 Mean reaction time modulated by both salience and value. Mean reaction 
time across all participants on high salience singleton trials ( the singleton task),  low 
salience singleton trials (the singleton task), no choice high salience trials, no choice low 
salience trials, high salience trial, low salience trial, congruent trials and incongruent 
trials. Asterisks indicate statistical significance of difference between conditions, * means 
p≤0.05, **means p≤0.01, *** means p≤0.001, ****means p≤0.001; in all cases from t-
tests. Sample size is nine. Error bars represent standard error of the mean.  
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condition without affecting accuracy, due to the absence of distractors. In contrast, during 
our main experiment the no-choice trials were embedded in a larger number of choice 
trials. In this situation the subject’s threshold for selecting a target had to be higher than 
in the choice condition, because in the majority of trials there were two competing 
targets, whose value needed to be compared. In principle, there was an absence of 
distractors in the no-choice trials that was similar to the singleton trials. However, since 
the two trial types were randomized, the subjects could not be sure when a no-choice 
would occur and therefore could not adjust their response criteria selectively.  
In choice trials, the reaction time in high salience trials (mean: 851 ms) was 
significantly faster (K-S test, p=0.032) than in low salience trials (mean: 913 ms). 
Moreover, the congruency between differences in value and reward salience had a strong 
effect on the target selection process. In congruent as well as in incongruent trials, the 
two targets varied both in value and in salience. In congruent trials, the more valuable 
target had also more salient reward information. Thus, both the difference in value and in 
salience supported the same target. In contrast, in incongruent trials the more valuable 
target had less salient reward information. Here, the difference in value and in salience 
supported different targets. Accordingly, across all value levels, the reaction time on 
congruent trials (mean: 822 ms) was significantly faster (K-S test, p<10-13) than on 
incongruent trials (mean: 953 ms; Figure 4). This difference could not be explained 
merely by the fact that the chosen targets differed in salience. The reaction time on 
congruent trials was still significantly faster (K-S test, p=0.01) than that on high salience 
trials (Figure 2.4), even though the salience of the chosen targets were the same. 
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Likewise, the reaction time on incongruent trials was also significantly slower (K-S test, 
p<0.01) than that on low salience trials (Figure 2.4). 
2.2.3 Error trials 
In the experiment, we did not set a very stringent time-limit on the decision 
process. Therefore, the error rates, defined as the rate of choosing the lower valued target, 
were low in general. Nevertheless, we also saw an effect of congruency on error rate 
(Figure 2.5A). The error rates for high salience, low salience, and congruent trials was 
low (high: 4.3%; low: 5.8%; congruent: 4.4%). Specifically, the error rate for low 
salience trials was not significantly higher (K-S test, p=0.25) than the one for high 
salience trials. This indicated that the participants were still able to identify the color of 
the low salience targets, although those targets were harder to identify. In contrast, the 
error rate for incongruent trials was much higher (13.1%).  This is higher than the error 
rates for high salience (K-S test, p=0.01), and congruent trials (K-S test, p=0.01) as well 
as for low salience trials although the latter difference was not significant (K-S test, 
p=0.07).  
Furthermore, we compared the reaction time distribution of the error and correct 
trials during choice trials. To quantify the differences, we plotted the cumulative 
distribution for both error trials and correct trials in all four trial conditions. As shown in 
Figures 2.5C and 2.6, in low and high salience trials, the reaction time on error trials 
(mean RT: low salience trial: 959 ms, high salience trial: 924 ms) tended to be longer 
than on correct trials (mean RT: low salience trial: 913 ms, high salience trial: 851 ms). 
Though the differences did not reach significance (K-S test, p=0.28 and p=0.25, 




Figure 2.5 Error rates and mean reaction times on different trial types. A: Mean 
error rate for all participants for different trial types. B: Mean error rate in incongruent 
trial for all participants as a function of chosen value. C:  Mean reaction time for both 
correct (light orange) and wrong (dark orange) choice on different trial types. See Fig. 5 
for the meaning of the asterisks. Sample size is nine. Error bars represent standard error 





Figure 2.6 Cumulative reaction time distributions. Cumulative distributions of 
reaction time are plotted for correct (black) and error (red) trials on high salience trials 
(K-S test, p=0.28), low salience trials (K-S test, p=0.25), congruent trials (K-S test, 




population.  In congruent trials, this difference became larger. The reaction time for error 
trials (mean RT: 955 ms) was significantly longer (K-S test, p=0.001) than for correct 
trials (mean RT: 823 ms). In contrast to all other trial types, in incongruent trials the 
reaction time for error trials (RT: 876 ms) was significantly shorter (K-S test, p=0.01) 
than for correct trials (mean RT: 953 ms). Note that this shorter reaction time on error 
trials was not confounded by the chosen value on those trials. First, on error trials (by 
definition) a smaller value was chosen than on correct trials. Second, the error rate did 
not increase as the chosen value increase (Figure 2.5B). The chosen value on error trials 
was therefore on average not larger than the chosen value on correct trials. This specific 
difference in the reaction time distributions between congruent and incongruent trials 
turned out to be important, because, as we shall see below, it allowed us to distinguish 
between different types of accumulator models of the decision process. 
2.2.4 Descriptive model of behavior 
To summarize, in the main experiment, the reaction time across the six different 
trial types was correlated with the value of the chosen target, the salience of the reward 
information, and the contingency between value and salience (Figure 2.7). Across all 
chosen values in the main experiment, the reaction time was shortest for no-choice high 
salience trials, increased successively for no-choice low salience, congruent, high 
salience, low salience trials, and was longest for incongruent trials. This was very 
different from the results in the second pilot experiment (singleton task), in which the 
results showed no difference between reactions to high and low salience targets (Figures 




Figure 2.7 Mean reaction times  for both second pilot and main experiment. Mean 
reaction time in the second pilot experiment are plotted against different targets with 
corresponding colors without value information on high salience singleton  trials (green 
solid line), low salience singleton trials (green dotted line) in the singleton task (second 
pilot experiment).  The reaction time in the main experiment are plotted against value of 
the chosen targets on no-choice high salience trials (black solid line), no-choice low 
salience trials (black dotted line), high salience trials ( blue solid line), low salience trials 
(blue dotted line), congruent trials (red solid line), and incongruent trials (red dotted line). 
Sample size is nine. Error bars represent standard error of the mean reaction time.  
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We further used a descriptive model to quantify the trends we had observed in the 
behavior data. There were a number of factors that could contribute to the decision- 
making process, including 1) the value of the chosen target, 2) the salience of the chosen 
target, 3) the value of the non-chosen target, 4) the salience of the non-chosen target, 5)  
the value difference between chosen and non-chosen target, 6) the salience difference 
between chosen and non-chosen target, as well as the multiplicative interaction between 
salience and value for both 7) chosen and 8) non-chosen target. In order to quantify the 
effect of each of these possible factors, we fitted a family of nested regression models to 
the reaction times in correct choice trials that included all possible iterations of the seven 
factors plus a baseline term. In order to combine the reaction time data across all 
participants, we normalized reaction times within each participant between 0 to 1 (thus, 
the normalized RTs computed in eq. 11 cannot be directly compared with the actual RTs 
in Fig. 4). By comparing the Bayesian information criterion value (BIC), and Akaike 
value (Burnham and Anderson, 2002; Busemeyer and Diederich, 2010)  of each model 
(Table 1), we identified the best fitting model.  Of all linear models tested, the lowest BIC 
value and lowest Akaike value occurred for the same model: 
0.5209 0.0015* 0.0373*
                  0.0018*( ) 0.0188*( )
normalized chosen chosen
chosen nonchosen chosen nonchosen
RT v s
v v s s
= − −
− − − −
     (2.1) 
where vchosen and vnon-chosen are the point values of the chosen and non-chosen target (
(0,0.1,0.2,0.4,0.8)iv ∈ ), and 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 and 𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  are the salience values of the chosen 
and non-chosen targets (𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 ∈ (0,1)), respectively. All four parameters (but none of the 
other four possibilities listed above) contributed significantly to the regression, including: 
1) value of the chosen target (t-test: p<10-7), 2) salience of the chosen target (t-test: 
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Rank Variables resulting in model BIC AIC Evidence ratio 
1 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣,𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜  -8711 8734 1 
2 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜, 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜   -8711 -8734 1 
10 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣, 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  -8710 -8733 1.23 
13 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣 -8708 -8726 3.90 
17 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣,𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜, 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
× 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  
-8705 -8732 23.90 
 
Table 2.1  BIC table for descriptive behavior regression model. All possible 
combinations of eight independent variables:  𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 
𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  (𝑑𝑑𝑣𝑣), 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 − 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  (𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜), interaction between chosen value and 
salience (𝑣𝑣𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ), interaction between non-chosen value and non-chosen 
salience (𝑣𝑣𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 × 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ) were tested against the behavioral data. The first 
column shows the BIC rank of the model among all other 255 models. The second 
column shows the selected variables with the corresponding rank. The third column 
shows the BIC value, the forth column shows the AIC value, and the fifth column shows 




p<10-5), 3) value difference between chosen and non-chosen target (t-test: p<10-4), and 
4)salience difference between chosen and non-chosen target (t-test: p=0.001). Table 1 
shows the BIC values, Akaike value and evidence ratio (relative to the best-fitting model) 
for different models ranked by their fit to the behavioral data. From the evidence ratios it 
is clear that there were actually approximately 12 different regression models all 
containing 4 variables that all fitted the data almost as well as the best-fitting model. This 
phenomenon is likely related to the fact that the variables we chose were most likely not 
completely independent of each other such as the equation containing Schosen  and 
Snonchosen  can be equally expressed as an equation containing Schosen  and dS.  However, 
there was a clear drop in evidence for alternative 3- or 5-variable models. 
2.2.5 Accumulator models 
The behavioral results, confirmed by a linear regression model, showed that both 
value and salience of the targets as well as the congruency between them influence the 
decision- making process. To make progress towards understanding the underlying 
mechanisms, we modeled the decision process using accumulator models with four 
functionally related architectures (Figure 2.8). In addition to suggesting a functional 
mechanistic explanation of the underlying mechanisms, accumulator models have the 
additional advantage over descriptive regression models (like the one developed in the 
previous section) that they describe the entire distribution of behavioral data, rather than 
only their mean values. This modeling approach allowed us to address several questions 
beyond the identification of the behaviorally relevant factors. Most importantly, it 
allowed us to ask questions regarding the functional architecture of the decision-making 




Figure 2.8 Architecture of the four accumulator models. A:  Model 1: Independent  
model, without mutual inhibition between the targets. B:  Model 2: Speed model. 
Salience influences the rate of accumulation but not its the onset. C: Model 3: Onset 
model. Salience influences the onset of accumulation but not its rate. D:  Model 4: Full 
model with feed forward inhibition model salience influencing both the onset of 
accumulation and its rate. vi are the units that transfer sensory input into value. mi are the 
accumulators that integrate the input and trigger a motor response. Consistent with 
appendix equation 2, Δt=t1-t2 is the onset difference generated by salience differences, Ni 
is the number of accumulations that occur in each accumulator mi, I(vi) is the rate of 





analysis, we focused specifically on two of these mechanistic questions. First, is there a 
role for inhibitory interactions between the processes representing the two targets? 
Second, how does the salience of the reward information influence the decision- making 
process? In addition, accumulator models incorporated in a natural fashion non-linearity 
in the decision-making process, such as the threshold, which is not easy to be captured in 
a linear regression model. 
Models 1-3 have the same complexity (6 parameters). As described below, they 
are special cases of the general functional Model 4 which is slightly more complex with 7 
parameters. In order to determine the importance of particular factors, for Model 1-3, we 
systematically constrained one factor of the general model (Model 4), while allowing the 
other factors to change freely to achieve the best possible fit with the behavioral data. All 
other aspects of the functional architecture were held constant across the four different 
variants (mutual inhibition for model 1, onset difference for model 1, accumulation speed 
for model 3, none for model 4) .All models have two accumulator units, each of which 
integrates the input from the target whose choice they would trigger until it reaches the 
response threshold. The quanta size of the input for accumulation is determined by the 
target value. The rational for this design choice follows immediately from the idea that 
what is accumulated during the decision process is support for a particular choice (here 
the value that is associated with selecting a particular target). In Model 1 (independent 
model), salience influences both the onset and the rate of accumulation but the two 
accumulators are independent, with no inhibitory interaction between them (Figure 
2.9A). In contrast, Models 2 (speed model) and 3 (onset model) are feed-forward 




Figure 2.9 Examples of the time evolution of variables in independent models in 
incongruent trials. Within each plot, the upper panels are examples for correct trials, the 
lower panels for error trials. The paths for high value low salience targets are shown in 
red, and for low value high salience targets are in black.  All competitions start at 0 and 
threshold is always 100. A: Model 1:  independent model, no mutual inhibition between 
targets. B: Model 2:  speed model, salience influences the rate of accumulation. C: Model 




whose choice they would trigger, but in addition they receive inhibitory input from the 
alternative target, with the inhibitory strength determined by the behavioral fit. The 
strength can therefore approach zero, which includes the condition enforced in model 1. 
The key difference between Models 2 and 3 is the mechanism by which salience 
influences the integration process. Model 2 assumes that salience influences the quality 
of the perceptual process output, and thus the probability of accumulation, which is 
independent of the input strength which is determined by value (Figure 2.9B). This 
results in a modulation of the mean drift rate, which is orthogonal to the effect of value, 
as supported by our behavioral analysis. In Model 3, on the other hand, salience is 
assumed to influence the onset time of the accumulation process (Figure 2.9C), but not 
the probability of accumulation (i.e., mean drift rate). Finally, salience is free to modify 
both onset and drift rate in Model 4 (Figure 2.9 D). 
We optimized the parameters in all four models using the observed reaction times 
in correct choice trials, which were used as the training set for parameter tuning. We then 
compared the simulated reaction time distribution with the training set reaction 
distribution using person chi-square statistics (Van Zandt et al., 2000; Purcell et al., 2010) 
. This method maximized the proportion of correct responses in addition to matching the 
distribution of observed RTs. In order to avoid over fitting of the training data and to test 
the models' capability of prediction, in addition, we compared the predicted behavioral 
performance with two test sets, neither of which was used during training. One was the 
observed behavior in no-choice trials, the other was the behavior in erroneous choice 
trials (the trials in which the participant chose the lower valued target). In addition, we 
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also used the BIC to test both fitness and prediction of the models. The results of this 
analysis are consistent with the results using the chi-square criterion (table 2).  
2.2.6 Mutual inhibition is necessary to explain behavior 
The independent model (Model 1) did not explain the reaction times well. Its 
mean χ2 fit (7.08) was significantly larger than that for the other two constrained models 
(Model 2: mean χ2 fit, 2.44; t-test, df=29, p<10-8, Model 3: mean χ2 fit, 2.24; t-test, df=29, 
p<10-10). More importantly, the predicted reaction times in no-choice trials did not fit the 
observed reaction times (Figure 2.10 A,B). Specifically, a very general characteristic of 
the observed reaction time data was the increased reaction time latency on choice trials as 
opposed to no-choice trials (Figure 2.7). In contrast, the independent model predicted that 
the reaction times for choice trials were as fast as those in no- choice trials, due to the 
lack of inhibition from the non-chosen target. In addition, Model 1 overestimated the 
error rate on incongruent trials (Figure 2.10C) and it failed to predict the observation that 
on incongruent trials the reaction times on error trials were shorter than those on correct 
trials (Figure 2.10D). For no-choice trials, the mean χ2 value (12.84) of Model 1 was 
significantly larger than that of the other two models (Model 2: χ2: 8.38, t-test, df=29, 
p<10-15, Model 3: χ2: 3.61, t-test, df=29, p<10-34). In sum, the analysis of Model 1 
showed very clearly that mutual inhibition between two choices is important for target 
selection. Model 2, in which salience modulates the accumulation rate, reaction time 
differences caused by salience differences were positively correlated with the time it took 
the accumulated activity to reach the threshold. Therefore, this model predicted that the 
reaction time difference caused by salience will be larger for choice trials than for no- 
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 choice trial no-choice trial 
 
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓  𝜒𝜒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓2  𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓  𝜒𝜒𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓2  
Independent 
model -111.86 7.08 -15.76 12.87 
Speed model -114.68 2.44 -39.30 8.38 
Onset model -115.51 2.44 -44.27 3.61 
Full model -114.37 3.50 -37.89 8,20 
Table 2.2 Fitness of four different models in fitting reaction time on choice trials and 
predicting reaction time on no-choice trials. The first column shows the type of the 
model under testing. The second and third columns show the BIC value and 𝜒𝜒2 for the 
choice trials when optimizing model parameters during the training section. The fourth 
and fifth rows show the BIC value and 𝜒𝜒2  for the no-choice trials when testing the 





Figure 2.10 Predictions of Model 1 (independent model). A: Predicted mean reaction 
times are plotted against the value of the chosen targets on different trial types. Each 
sample size is a 100 simulations. Error bars represent standard error of the mean reaction 
time. Symbols are as in Figure 7. B: Predicted mean reaction times are plotted against 
observed mean reaction time for 24 different choice trial types (black circle) and 10 
different no-choice trial types (red circle). C: Comparison between observed (light orange) 
and predicted error rate (grey) on different trial types. D: Comparison between observed 
(correct trial: light orange; error trial: dark orange) and predicted (correct trial: light grey; 





choice trials (Figure 2.11A).  On the other hand, in Model 3, in which salience modulates 
the accumulation onset, reaction time differences caused by salience were independent of 
how long it takes the activity to reach threshold. Therefore, this model predicted that the 
reaction time difference caused by salience will be similar for choice and no-choice trials 
(Figure 2.12A). Consequently, when the parameters of both models were adjusted so that 
they fit the reaction time differences in choice trials, the salience-induced reaction time 
differences in no-choice trials predicted by Model 2 should be smaller than the ones 
predicted by Model 3. This is exactly what the simulations showed (Figures 2.11A, 
2.12A). Specifically, Model 2 predicted that reaction times in no-choice trials should not 
be significantly influenced by salience, as can be seen by comparing the solid and dotted 
black lines in Figure 2.11B. This prediction is not unreasonable. The luminance contrast 
of high salience targets was similar to that of low salience targets. This allowed the single 
targets to be equally localized. Furthermore, value information was not behaviorally 
relevant, since no choice was required. Therefore, one might expected that differences in 
salience do not necessarily influence reaction time similar as in the singleton task (Figure 
2.7). In contrast, Model 3 predicted that reaction times to targets with high salience of the 
reward information should be faster than the ones to targets with low salience, as 
indicated in the corresponding plot in Figure 2.12A. 
This difference in the predictions of the two models allowed us to compare how 
well they fit the observed behavioral data. A comparison of the actual (Figure 2.7) with 
the predicted reaction times (Figure 2.11A, 2.12A) showed that, overall, Model 3 agreed 
much better with observations than Model 2. The behavioral fit of Model 3 (mean χ2 test 








Figure 2.12 Predictions of Model 3 (onset model).  Symbols are as in Figure 2.10.  
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Model 2 (mean χ2 test =8.38). In particular, the human participants showed consistently 
longer reaction times in no-choice trials with low salience targets compared to trials with 
high salience targets. Consequently, the comparison of predicted to observed reaction 
times in Figures 2.11B and 2.12B showed that for most no-choice trials (indicated by the 
red circles) the predicted RTs of Model 2 are too short, while the predictions of Model 3 
for no-choice trials were as accurate as for choice trials. 
Secondly, the two models also made different predictions with regards to the 
reaction times in error trials, providing another opportunity to determine which model 
provided a better description of behavior. The behavioral data showed that the reaction 
time in all trial types was significantly longer for erroneous than for correct responses, 
except for incongruent trials for which the pattern was incongruent trials for which the 
pattern was the opposite (Figure 2.5C). Thus, there was an inversion of reaction time for 
congruent and incongruent trials with respect to correct and erroneous responses. Both 
models predicted correctly that in congruent trials the reaction time  was significantly 
longer on error trials than on correct trials (Model 2: K-S test, p=0.004; Model 3: K-S 
test, p=0.003). On incongruent trials, however, Model 2 predicted that the reaction time 
on erroneous trials was also significantly longer (K-S test, p=0.002) than on correct trials 
(Figure 2.11D). This is because an error can only occur when the accumulator associated  
with the low value target happened to reach the threshold earlier than the one associated 
with the high value target. Since in Model 2 the low value accumulator tended to rise 
slowly, this can only happen if the competing high value accumulator also rose slowly. 
Thus, in this model the reaction time on error trials had to be longer than on correct trials 
(Figure 9B).  
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In contrast, Model 3 accurately predicted shorter reaction times on erroneous than 
on correct incongruent trials (Figure 12D). Sensitivity analysis showed that the difference 
in onset time of the accumulation between high and low salience targets was significantly 
linearly correlated (t-test, df=47, p<10-8, Sobol Index: 0.43) with the reaction time 
differences between error and correct trials on incongruent trials (Figure 13).  In Model 3, 
errors were due to the earlier onset of accumulation for the low value targets. This onset  
time difference, especially when it is large, created a window of opportunity for the low 
value accumulation process during which it experienced no competition from the high 
value accumulation process. Therefore, in this model the reaction times on error trials 
tended to be shorter than on correct trials (Figure 2.9C). The fact that this prediction, 
which was specific for Model 3, was confirmed by the behavioral data gives further 
support for the hypothesis that differences in the onset latency of accumulation (as in 
Model 3) rather than in the rate of accumulation (as in Model 2) explains the salience 
effect in our behavioral choice task. 
Finally, we also optimized the full model, where salience could influence both 
onset and rate of the accumulation (Figure 2.14). This model has one parameter more 
than Models 2 and 3. We would therefore expect at least as good a fit to the training data 
as the best of the less complex models. However, Model 4 does not necessarily have 
better predictive power for the test data since it might still contains terms based on 
incorrect assumptions. Indeed, the full model did not significantly improve the accuracy 
of the reaction time fits in the training set (correct choice trial, mean χ2 fit =3.50), and it 





Figure 2.13 Effect of difference in the onset time of accumulation in Model 3 (onset 
model). The predicted mean reaction time difference between error and correct trials on 
incongruent trials  is correlated with the simulated time of accumulation onset, shown in 




Figure 2.14 Predictions of Model 4 (full model).  Symbols are as in Figure 2.10.  
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choice trials, mean χ2 test =8.20) over Model 3. This provided additional support for 
Model 3. 
2.3 Discussion 
We studied the influence of visual salience on value-based decision processes of 
human observers performing a two-alternatives-forced-choice task. Most previous studies 
examined the effect of visual saliency (Berg et al., 2009) and value (Platt and Glimcher, 
1999; Bendiksby and Platt, 2006; Milstein and Dorris, 2007; Milosavljevic et al., 2010)  
on saccades and decisions in isolation. In contrast, we manipulated saliency and value of 
targets simultaneously, in order to investigate how these two factors interact and how 
they influence the decision process. 
Our behavioral results showed that not only value, but also visual salience as well 
as congruency between value and visual salience influence the decision process. 
Specifically, we found that reaction time across all trial types is correlated with all three 
of these variables. Furthermore, congruency had an effect on error rates as well as on 
reaction times in error trials. These findings are in broad agreement with recent 
behavioral studies of eye movements in macaque monkeys and humans which also 
manipulated salience and value information simultaneously (Navalpakkam et al., 2010; 
Markowitz et al., 2011; Schutz et al., 2012). This convergence of findings across species 
and effector systems indicates that these behavioral trends are robust and reflect basic  
selection mechanisms in the primate brain. However, despite the similarity of the 
behavioral findings, the mechanism underlying these phenomena can differ depending on 




2.3.1 Onset time differences 
The speed and the onset model are based on different hypotheses how salience 
modulates the decision process. In the speed model, salience influences accumulation 
speed by modulating the probability of an increase in activity, which influences how 
likely the accumulator responds to the input independent of its strength. A possible 
neurophysiological interpretation could be that salience modulates the likelihood that  
an individual neuron responds to synaptic input, or how many neurons out of the entire 
pool of ‘decision’ neurons respond to the input in a given time interval and for a given 
stimulation. This interpretation does not seem to be unreasonable, given our current 
understanding of primate decision-making mechanisms. It is therefore quite noteworthy 
that our analysis ruled out this model so convincingly. Instead another model, namely the 
onset model, explained the observed reaction time distribution of error trials and no-
choice trials much better. 
In the onset model, salience influences the onset time of accumulators to 
accumulate value information instead of influencing accumulation speed. Specifically, 
this stochastic model suggests an earlier accumulation onset time when processing high 
compared to low salience targets. What might be the sources of this earlier onset? One 
possibility is that the difference is due to an attentional shift.  Specifically, high salience 
targets might attract attention first, as predicted by bottom-up attentional guidance 
models (Itti et al., 1998). Focus on one of the targets might in turn result in an advantage 
for the accumulation process associated with this target, similar to the logic underlying a 
recent model of how value-based decisions are guided by visual attention (Krajbich and 
Rangel, 2011; Lim et al., 2011). However, in our paradigm, attentional guidance can only 
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explain the behavioral results on choice trials but not on no-choice trials. In the latter, 
attention should always be focused on the only target present, but we found that reaction 
times still differed between high and low salience trials (Figure 7). Even though saliency-
based models (Itti et al., 1998) predict slightly faster deployment of attention to more 
salient than to less salient targets, the effect is likely too small to explain the size of the 
observed reaction time difference in no-choice trials. Allocation of attention can then not 
be the main reason for the onset differences in the accumulation process. 
An alternative hypothesis is that the onset difference is caused by differences in 
the visual processing time required for computing the value of high and low salience 
targets (Ratcliff et al., 2007; Ratcliff and Smith, 2011). Low salience targets might need 
more time to be identified than high salience targets. This hypothesis is consistent with 
our behavioral data, since the salience effect on reaction time is similar for choice and no-
choice trials. It is also supported by neurophysiological findings of clear effects of 
contrast, but not of attention, on visual response latencies in primates (Lee et al., 
2007).Our results suggest therefore that the onset time of accumulation is time-locked to 
the end of the visual processing. This implies a sequential form of information 
processing, similar to a recent model of target selection in frontal eye fields (Purcell et 
al., 2010). What might keep the accumulators from integrating evidence earlier?  One 
possibility is that a specific gating mechanism blocks accumulation until a certain degree 
of difference has developed in the input sources. Alternatively, in our model information 
about the location of potential targets drives the accumulators equally well and the two 
accumulators inhibit each other sufficiently to suppress any activity increase. Only when 
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value information is added, the symmetry is broken and the differentiated accumulation 
process can start. 
2.3.2 Functional architecture of value-based decision-making in primates 
Our analysis using stochastic accumulator models aimed at investigating the 
neuronal mechanisms underlying behavior. Obviously, simple modeling studies can only 
provide indirect evidence about mechanisms implemented in the brain. Nevertheless, the 
fact that our models show qualitative differences in their ability to explain behavioral data 
allows us to rule out entire families of functional architectures. The failure of Model 1, 
the independent model, shows that mutual inhibition between choices is required for the 
decision mechanism. The comparison between the two feed-forward inhibition models, 
speed and onset model, shows that increased visual salience leads to an earlier start of 
accumulation rather than an increased rate of accumulation. That the rate of accumulation 
plays a minor role, if any, is underscored by the fact that including it in addition to the 
change in onset time (Model 4) does not improve performance significantly. These 
findings allow us to formulate a strong hypothesis about the type of decision architecture 
that underlies the effects of visual salience and value information on choice behavior. 
One hypothesis is that value and salience independently drive action selection and 
compete for access to the motor system. Indeed, we observed that early choices reflected 
more strongly visual salience, while later choices were more driven by value, consistent 
with previous findings by Markowitz et al. (2011). These authors suggested that the 
reaction time difference is due to the time-varying balance between stimulus- and reward-
driven selections. This was reasonable, since in their study salience influenced both 
location and value-related information simultaneously. Information about target location 
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influences the preparation of motor acts directed towards these locations (Schiller and 
Tehovnik, 2005). Information about target identity, on the other hand, is crucial for the 
generation of value information, which in turn affects competition between different 
value options (Padoa-Schioppa, 2011). However, in our study, we designed stimuli whose 
salience influenced only the discrimination of target identity, but did not affect the ability 
to locate a target. Therefore, automatic selection processes driven by stimulus location 
were equally strong for all targets as confirmed by our second pilot study (singleton task; 
see Figure 2.4 & 2.7). If value and salience were competing during the decision process, 
the choice behavior should show a joint dependence on sensory and goal-directed 
processes. In contrast, our behavioral results do not show an interaction between visual 
salience and value.  
This suggests a second hypothesis that there is a combined value and salience 
map within the visuomotor system (Navalpakkam et al., 2010; Schutz et al., 2012). Under 
this hypothesis, the salience map formed is first influenced by bottom-up factors (in our 
case luminance contrast with the background) and is only later modified by value 
information. This implies that bottom-up salience alone can influence behavior 
independent of value information, in particular during early responses. However, in our 
study we were interested in dissociating the effect of salience on value-based decision- 
making from the one on motor generation in general. Indeed, the salience manipulation 
that we used does not seem to have influenced motor behavior very much, since the 
reaction time for both high and low salience targets is the same in the singleton task 
(Figure 2.4 & 2.7). Moreover, if the salience map is modulated by the attention captured 
by the objects associated with reward (Anderson et al., 2011), we would expect to see a 
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joint dependence between reward and salience, which is not shown in the result. 
Therefore, the salience effect in our experiment is less likely to be the result of early 
activation in the salience map driven by bottom up factors.  
Instead, these findings support a third alternative hypothesis about the interaction 
of salience and value in decision-making; namely that value-based action selection is a 
serial iterative decision process. First, lower sensory areas process the stimuli and derive 
value and location information from them. The salience of the relevant visual feature 
influences how long this process takes, but has no influence on the output of this stage. 
The processed information is then sent to accumulators in a higher comparative area that 
selects the final (and motor) response. At this point the value input has been stripped of 
other content, such as saliency. This serial processing hypothesis contains the predictions 
of the combined saliency map hypothesis as a special case. When the sensory features 
carrying both target location and identity information are of varying salience, the targets 
with more salient features will influence the decision-making stage earlier and there will 
be a higher likelihood that the subject will choose the more salient target (in particular, if 
the accumulation process was fast and there was less time for the less salient target to 
reach the accumulation stage). Behavior will appear as if bottom-up salience of the 
targets alone can influence choice independent of value information. Thus, for this set of 
experimental conditions, both hypotheses explain the behavior equally well. In contrast, 
our present experimental findings can only be explained by the serial processing 
hypothesis, but not the combined saliency map hypothesis. This attribute of the serial 
processing hypothesis is attractive. Nevertheless, at this point we do not know, if this 
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conjecture is indeed correct, since we have not tested subjects in both conditions and 
determined if our model can really explain data across both situations. 
The higher order areas involved in the final decision likely include structures 
representing subjective value, such as orbitofrontal (Padoa-Schioppa and Assad, 2006) 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Kim et al., 2008; Lim et al., 2011), and/or  visual-
motor association structures, such as the lateral intraparietal area (Platt and Glimcher, 
1999; Sugrue et al., 2004), supplementary eye field (So and Stuphorn, 2010), or the 
supplementary motor area (Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010). Given our results, it is worth 
investigating whether and how these areas integrate both visual salience and value 
information during value-based decision- making when salience influences selectively 







Chapter 3  
General Methods 
This chapter is a methods chapter. In the chapter, the main behavior paradigm will 
be introduced. This paradigm together with its modified versions will be used throughout 
the whole dissertation work. The chapter will also discuss the basic techniques used in 
the dissertation project, including monkey neurophysiology set up, the general methods 
for recording and basic analysis methods. This will provide background knowledge for 
the following chapters. 
3.1 Experimental Set-Up and Surgery 
Two rhesus monkeys (both male; monkey A: 7.5 kg, monkey I: 7.2 kg) were 
trained to perform the tasks used in this study. All animal care and experimental 
procedures were approved by Johns Hopkins University Animal Care and Use 
Committee. During the experimental sessions, each monkeys was seated in a primate 
chair, with its head restrained, facing a video screen. Eye position was monitored with an 
infrared corneal reflection system (Eye link,SR Research ltd., Ottawa, Canada) and 
recorded with the Plexon system (Plexon Inc., Dalls,TX) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz. 
56 
 
The monkeys were water restricted, and we use steamed water as reward to motivate the 
monkeys' participation. We used a newly developed fluid delivery system to deliver the 
water. The system was based on the two syringe pumps connected to a fluid container 
that was controlled by a stepper motor. This delivery system made sure the accuracy of 
the fluid amounts which is critical for our experiment design. 
All surgical procedures were done under sterile conditions and also accordance 
with the rules and regulations of the Johns Hopkins Animal Care and Use Committee. 
3.2 Behavior Paradigm --- a gambling task 
In the gambling task, the monkeys had to make saccades to peripheral targets that 
were associated with different amounts of reward (Figure 3.1A). The targets were squares 
of various colors, 2.25×2.25° in size. They were always presented 10° away from the 
central fixation point at a 45, 135, 225, or 315° angle. There were 7 different targets 
(Figure 3.1B), and each gamble target consisted of two colors corresponding to the two 
possible reward amounts. The portion of a color within the target corresponded to the 
probability of receiving that reward amount. Four different colors indicated four different 
reward amounts (increasing from 1, 3, 5 to 9 units of water, where 1 unit equaled 30 µl). 
The minimum reward amount for the gamble option was always 1 unit of water, while the 
maximum reward amount ranged from 3, 5 to 9 units, with three different probabilities of 
receiving the maximum (20, 40, and 80%). This resulted in a set of gambles, as shown in 
the matrix (Figure 3.1B), whose expected value on the diagonal axis was the same. 
The task consisted of two types of trials- choice trials and no-choice trials. All the 




Figure 3.1 Gambling task.  A: Sequence of events during choice trials (top) and no-
choice trials (bottom). The lines below indicate the duration of various time periods in the 
gambling task. The black arrow is not part of the stimuli; it symbolizes the monkeys' 
choices which then lead to the next stimulus shown. B: Visual cues used in the gambling 
task. Four different colors indicated four different reward amounts (increasing from 1, 3, 
5 to 9 units of water, where 1 unit equaled 30 µl). The expected value of the gamble 




3.1A), on which the monkeys were required to fixate for 500-1000 ms.  In choice trials, 
two targets appeared on two locations that were randomly chosen among the four 
quadrants. Simultaneously, the fixation point disappeared and within 1000 ms the 
monkeys had to choose between the gambles by making a saccade toward one of the 
targets. Following the choice, the non-chosen target disappeared from the screen. The 
monkeys were required to keep fixating on the chosen target for 500-600ms, after which 
the target changed color. The two-colored square then changed into a single-colored 
square associated with the final reward amount. This indicated the result of the gamble to 
the monkeys. The monkeys were required to continue to fixate on the target for another 
300 ms until the reward was delivered. In the choice trial, each gamble option was paired 
with all other six gamble options. This resulted in 21 different combinations of options 
that were offered in choice trials. The sequence of events in the no-choice trials was the 
same as in the choice trials except that only one target was presented. In those trials, the 
monkeys were forced to make a saccade to the given target. All 7 gamble options were 
presented during no-choice trials. A subset (22%) of choice trials were onset-difference 
trials, in which one target appeared three video frames (~50ms) earlier than the second 
target (Figure 3.1C). The onset-difference trials consisted of four specific comparisons of 
gamble options with varying degrees of difference in subjective value.  Each option could 
be either the early or late onset target, resulting in 8 different types of onset-difference 
trials.   
We presented no-choice and choice trials mixed together in blocks of trials that 
consisted of all twenty one different choice trials and eight onset different trials and seven 
different no-choice trials. Within a block, the order of trials was randomized. The 
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locations of the targets in each trial were also randomized, which prevented the monkeys 
from preparing a movement toward a certain direction before the target appearance.  
3.3 Estimation of subjective value 
We used Maximum Likelihood Difference Scaling (MLDS) (Maloney and Yang, 
2003; Kingdom and Prins, 2010) to estimate the subjective value of different targets. The 
algorithm is an optimization algorithm which gives the best estimation of the subjective 
value and internal noise based on the maximum across-trial. The maximum across-trial 
likelihood is defined as:  
1
( (1), (2),... ( ), ) log ( ; (1), (2),... ( ), )
T
d e k k d
k
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=
=∑              (3.1) 
where ( )iψ  are the subjective value for all the targets, dσ  is the internal noise,  rk is the 
response (chosen:1 or non-chosen:0 ) on the kth trial, and 𝐷𝐷𝑘𝑘  is the estimated subjective 
value difference between two targets in the kth trial given the set of subjective value and 
internal noise, 𝑟𝑟 the full set of responses across all trials and 𝑇𝑇 the number of trials. We 
performed the MLDS using Matlab based toolbox "Palamedes " developed by Prins and 
Kindom (Prins and Kingdom, 2009). 
3.4 Electrophysiology recording 
3.4.1 Single unit recording 
After training, we placed a hexagon chamber ( 29 mm in diameter) centered over 
the midline, 28 mm (monkey A) and 27 mm (monkey I ) anterior of the interaural line. .  
Then after a minimum six week healing period, we performed a craniotomy within this 
60 
 
chamber under ketamine anesthesia.  The site of the craniotomy was cleaned daily with 
sterile saline (0.9% sodium chloride), Betadine Solution (10% povidine iodine), and 
Nolvasan (0.5% chlorhexidine gluconate).  When recording within the opened region was 
complete, the craniotomy was enlarged to expose a new area for sampling.  After each 
recording session, the craniotomy and surrounding area were thoroughly cleaned, the 
recording chamber was filled with sterile saline, and a titanium cover was screwed onto 
the chamber in order to keep the area clean and isolated from the external environment.   
During each recording session, single units were recorded using 1-4 tungsten 
microelectrodes with an impedance of 2-4 MΩs (Frederick Haer, Bowdoinham, ME). 
The microelectrodes were advanced using a self-built microdrive system. .A hexagonal 
chamber system enabled us to position the electrode over the brain within a grid 
framework of 0.25 mm spacing. 
Data were collected using the PLEXON system. Up to four template spikes were 
identified using principal component analysis and the time stamps  and local field 
potential were then collected at a sampling rate of 1,000 Hz. Data were subsequently 
analyzed off-line to ensure only single units were included in consequent analyses. 
3.4.2 Cortical location 
To determine the location of the SEF, we obtained magnetic resonance images 
(MRI) for monkey A and monkey I. A three-dimensional (3-D) model of the brain was 
constructed using MIPAV (BIRSS, NIH). As an anatomical landmark, we used the 
location of the branch of the arcuate sulcus. The locations of neuronal recording sites are 




Figure 3.2  Recording locations in SEF. Red dots indicate the locations in which 
neurons showed task related activity before saccade onset. Blue dots indicate the 
locations in which neurons were not modulated by task before saccade onset.  Black 
squares indicate the position of the cooling plate.  A: Recording sites in monkey A. B: 




period in the region from 0 to 11 mm anterior to the genu of the arcuate branch and 
within 5 mm to 2mm of the longitudinal fissure (Figure 3.2A). We designated these 
neurons as belonging to the SEF, consistant with previous studies from our lab and 
existing literature (Tehovnik et al., 2000; So and Stuphorn, 2011). In monkey I, neurons 
from 0 to 11 mm anterior to the genu of the arcuate branch and within 5 mm to 2mm of 
the longitudinal fissure formed a cluster of neurons with saccade-related activity and 
were designated as belonging to the SEF (Figure 3.2B). 
3.5 Neurophysiology data analysis 
3.5.1 Spike density functions 
To represent neural activity as a continuous function, we calculated spike density 
functions by convolving the spike train with a growth-decay exponential function that 
resembled a post-synaptic potential.  Each spike therefore exerts influence only forward 
in time.  The equation describes rate (R) as a function of time (t):    
𝑅𝑅(𝑓𝑓)  =  (1 −  𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(−𝑓𝑓/𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔)) ∙  𝑜𝑜𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒(−𝑓𝑓/𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑  )                                          (3.2) 
, where 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔  is the time constant for the growth phase of the potential, and 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 , is the time 
constant for the decay phase.  Based on physiological data from excitatory synapses, we 
used 1 ms for the value of 𝜏𝜏𝑔𝑔  and 20 ms for the value of 𝜏𝜏𝑑𝑑 (Sayer et al., 1990). 
3.5.2 Task-related neurons 
We used several criterions to determine whether neurons were task related. To 
test whether a neuron was active while the monkey generated saccades to the targets, we 
analyzed the neuronal activity in the time period between target onset to saccade 
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initiation. We performed a t-test on the spike rate in 50 ms intervals throughout the 
saccade preparation time period (150 ms to 0 ms before saccade onset or 50ms to 200 ms 
after target onset) to compare against the baseline period (200 ms to 150ms prior to target 
onset). If p value were ≤0.05 for any of the intervals, the cell was deemed to have activity 
significantly different form baseline.  
Furthermore, we used a more stringent way to define the task related neuron by 
fitting a family of regression models to the neuronal activity and determining the best-
fitting model (So and Stuphorn, 2011).  




                                                                                     (3.3) 
where 𝑏𝑏1 is the weight coefficient, s (𝑜𝑜 ∈ (0,1)) is the steepness, and t (𝑓𝑓 ∈ (0,1))is the 
threshold value.   
The influence of saccade direction (𝐷𝐷) on neuronal activity was described using a 
circular Gaussian function 
𝑔𝑔(𝐷𝐷) = 𝑏𝑏2 × 𝑜𝑜{𝑤𝑤×[cos (𝐷𝐷−𝑒𝑒)]
−1}                                                               (3.4) 
where 𝑏𝑏2is the weight coefficient,  w (𝑤𝑤 ∈ (0, 4𝜋𝜋])is the turning width, p (𝑒𝑒 ∈ [0,2𝜋𝜋]) is 
the preferred direction of the neuron. 




ℎ(𝑉𝑉,𝐷𝐷) = 𝑓𝑓(𝑉𝑉) × 𝑔𝑔(𝐷𝐷) = 𝑏𝑏3 ×
1
1+𝑜𝑜−𝑜𝑜(𝑉𝑉−𝑓𝑓)
× 𝑜𝑜{𝑤𝑤×[cos (𝐷𝐷−𝑒𝑒)]−1}             (3.5) 
where 𝑏𝑏3 is the weight coefficient. 
For each neuron, we fitted the average neuronal activity before saccade (50ms 
before saccade onset to 20 ms after saccade onset) on each no-choice trial with all 
possible linear combinations of the three terms 𝑓𝑓(𝑉𝑉), 𝑔𝑔(𝐷𝐷), ℎ(𝑉𝑉,𝐷𝐷) as well as with a 
simple constant model (𝑏𝑏0) . We identified the best fitting model for each neuron by 
finding the model with the minimum Bayesian information criterion (Burnham and 
Anderson, 2002; Busemeyer and Diederich, 2010) 
log( ) log( )RSSBIC n k n
n
= × + ×                                                              (3.6) 
where n is the number of trials (a constant in our case), and RSS the residual sum 
of squares after fitting.  We used a loosely defined BIC in order to include more neurons 
into analysis, where k is the number of independent variables in the equation. A lower 
numerical BIC value indicates better fit of a model, with a lower residual sum of squares 
indicating better predictive power, and a larger k penalizes less parsimonious models. All 
neurons with lower BIC value than the baseline model were considered stringently task 









Chapter 4  
Competition between Choice Options 
After the animal training as described in the previous chapter, we did recording in 
SEF to look at the correlation between neuronal activity and monkeys' choice behavior. 
In this chapter, we will discuss in detail whether and how the action value signals for 
both choice options compete with each other, and contribute to the decision process. 
4.1 Specific Methods 
4.1.1 Population analysis 
The normalized time-direction maps for population analysis were generated from 
the neuronal activity in no-choice trial and in choice trial when two options were 180° 
apart. The colors indicate the magnitude of firing rate which was normalized by setting 
the baseline activity (mean activity between 50 to 0 before target onset for all trials) as 0 
and maximum activity (the maximum mean activity across all the trial type) as 1. For 
each cell, we first estimated its preferred direction by fitting the directional tuning with 
circular Gaussian term as described in BIC analysis (section 3.4.2). After that, we 
calculated the relative angular distance between its preferred direction and the target 
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location for every trial. We then sorted the relative angular distance from small to large 
and rotated the matrix to let the chosen target position to always be 90° (except the 
analysis of the error trial in which we let the larger value targets instead of the chosen 
target to be in 90°). By doing this, we could average across all the trials since the target 
position is always the same. Population data were finally displayed as 2D pseudo-color 
plot, with each horizontal row representing the location of the selected target with respect 
to each cell's preferred direction (interpolated at an angle of 7.2°) and each column 
representing the target with respect to either target onset or movement onset. 
4.1.2 Leaky integrator model 
A mean-rate leaky-integrator neuronal model with two layers of 200 neurons each 
was implemented as a dynamical system describing the neuronal activity in SEF. In this 
model, the first layer is an input layer, which receives action value input for different 
target options 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗   and send the activity to the second layer through a feed forward 
network. The second layer is an decision layer where the each neuron is activated not 
only by the output from the first layer but also by the direction information of the target 
as described by 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 . Each neuron in the decision layer is governed by the following non-
linear differential equation: 
𝑑𝑑𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
𝑑𝑑𝑓𝑓
= 𝑓𝑓(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + Θ − 𝛼𝛼(𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖))                                                                 (4.1) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is the excitory input into the decision layer: 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑉𝑉𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                                             (4.2) 
and 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the inhibitory input from the first layer: 
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𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ∙ 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽∑ 𝐷𝐷𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗                                                                         (4.3) 
The first term in the function describes the mutual inhibition between different 
neurons, and the second term describes the global inhibition or activation from the first 
layer to the second layer. In function 4.1, 𝛼𝛼 is a decay rate and α is the Gaussian noise. 𝑓𝑓 
is a sigmoid transfer function, which implements the quenching dynamics. This transfer 
function contains a faster than linear portion for large value of x. It allows the neuron to 
exert more inhibition to other neurons when its activity gets large while reduce the 
neuron's sensitivity to noisy input.   
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Subjects' choice behavior in the gamble task 
As discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.2), two monkeys (A and I) were trained to 
perform a gambling task (Figure 3.1), in which they chose between two different gamble 
options with different maximum reward and reward probability. The maximum and 
minimum amounts of reward they can get were indicated by the color of the target. The 
portion of a color within the target corresponded to the probability of receiving the 
reward amount. We used the Maximum Likelihood Difference Scaling to estimate the 
subjective value for each targets based on the choice probability of the monkeys for all 
combinations of options (section 3.3). The subjective value of the targets increased as the 
expected value of the target increased (Figure 4.1A), since both animals chose the targets 
more often as their expected amount of reward increased. However, two monkeys 
showed different risk attitude.  While, monkey I was always risk seeking, Monkey A was 
risk seeking when the reward probability was low and maximum reward was high and 
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Figure 4.1  Behavior results for monkeys A (top) and monkey I (bottom).  A: The 
mean subjective value of the 7 gamble options is plotted as a function of expected value. 
Different colors indicate different amounts of maximum reward. B: The mean reaction 
times in no-choice trial as a function of subjective value. C: The mean reaction times in 
choice trial as a function of subjective value differences. D: The influence of onset time 




risk aversive when the reward probability was high and maximum reward was low. The 
value referred in following analysis is the subjective value rather than the expected value. 
Consistent with the human study as described in chapter 2, the mean saccade 
reaction times during no-choice trials were significantly negatively correlated with 
subjective value of the target (Figure 4.1B, monkey B: p=0.03 and monkey I: p=0.003, 
respectively).  On the two choice trials, the reaction times were significantly correlated 
with the subjective value difference between the two targets (Figure 4.1C, monkey B: 
p<10-14 and monkey I: p<10-4, respectively). On the onset difference trial ( Figure 4.1D), 
the probabilities of both monkeys choosing the early onset target were larger than normal 
condition, while the probability of  them choosing the late onset target was smaller than 
normal condition. The effect of onset difference was larger as the subjective value 
difference between two targets was larger. 
4.2.2 Non-divisive normalized firing pattern in SEF 
To understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying the choice behavior, we 
collected 516 neurons in SEF (290 from monkey A, 187 from monkey I, Figure 3.2). Of 
these, 362 neurons (70.16%) showed significant activities (t-test, p<0.05) during the 
saccade preparation period (210 from monkey B, 152 from monkey A). 128 neurons form 
362 neurons (35.36%) were considered as stringently task related by BIC criteria and 
were used in the following analysis (see Methods).  
Comparing choice and no-choice trial, SEF neurons either increased (Figure 4.2A) 
or decreased (Figure 4.2B) their activity when adding the second target in the choice trial. 




Figure 4.2 Comparison of neuronal activity in choice and no-choice trials. A:  A 
representative neuron which shows higher activity when the target in the receptive field 
was chosen and lower activity when it was non-chosen comparing to that in the no-choice 
trial. Shaded areas show the time period (50 ms before movement onset) used for the 
statistic test. B: A representative neuron which shows lower activity in choice trial than in 
no-choice trial. C: Distribution of activity differences between the choice trail when the 
target in receptive field was chosen and the no-choice trial. D: Distribution of activity 




was significantly larger in choice trial when the target was chosen (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p=0.03; mean difference: 1.38 spike/second for all neurons and 6.38 spike/second for 
the significant different ones, Figure 4.2C). Meanwhile, the mean activity for the 
preferred direction was significantly reduced in choice trial than in no-choice trial when 
the target was not chosen (Figure 4.2D; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p<10-3; mean 
difference: -1.43 spike/second for all neurons and -4.73 spike/second for the significant 
different ones). It is worthwhile to note that, in order to have a fair comparison, we 
controlled the value of chosen target, value of non-chosen target in choice trial and value 
of the chosen target in no-choice trial to be the same. Therefore, the difference shown 
here cannot be explained by the average value difference between the chosen targets and 
non-chosen targets. 
That this neuronal activity pattern in SEF is very different from the divisive 
normalization effect. Under such condition as divisive normalization, the neurons always 
show less activity when the number of options increase. Here, in the presence of an 
attractor/non-chosen target, the neuronal activity for the chosen targets was stronger than 
the activity in the no-choice trial. 
4.2.3 Competition between value of the choice options 
In order to visualize the competition between chosen and non-chosen value, we 
systematically varied either the chosen value or the non-chosen value while maintain the 
other to be the same. Figure 4.3 shows a representative SEF neuron. The neuronal 
activity was grouped by whether saccade was directed towards (preferred direction trials, 
PD trials) or opposite (non-preferred direction trials, NPD trials) to the preferred 




Figure 4.3 An representative neuron showing different degrees of chosen and non-
chosen values aligning on target onset (left)  and movement onset (right). A: The 
neuronal activity in the no-choice trial. Colors indicate the chosen value. B: The neuronal 
activity in the choice trial when the chosen value was controlled. Colors indicate the non-
chosen value of the choice. C: The neuronal activity in the choice trial when the non-
chosen value was controlled. Colors indicate the chosen value of the choice.  
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 by the chosen value of the targets in PD trials but was not activated by targets in NPD 
trials. Contrasting with the choice trials (Figure 4.3A, B), this neuron showed increased 
activity in both PD trials and NPD trials, and its activity was modulated by both chosen 
value and non-chosen value. Since each neuron represented the target information within 
its receptive field, the activity in PD trials then represented the activity to the target in 
receptive field which had been chosen, while the activity in the NPD trials represented 
the activity of the target in the receptive which was not chosen.  
Figure 4.3B shows the effect of non-chosen value on neuronal activity.  In the 
figure, the chosen value was controlled to be the highest amount while the non-chosen 
value was grouped into high, medium and small. As in the figure, the neuronal activity in 
the NPD trials which represent the activity for the non-chosen target was positively 
correlated with the value of non-chosen target. Meanwhile, the neuronal activity in PD 
trials, which represent the neuronal activity for the chosen target, was also modulated by 
the non-chosen value in a negative way especially when aligned on the target onset. The 
smaller the non-chosen value was, the earlier the neuronal activity for the chosen target 
peaked.  Figure 4.3 C shows the effect of chosen value on neuronal activity in the choice 
trial. When controlling the non-chosen value to be lowest, the neuronal activity in PD 
trials for the chosen target was strongly positively correlated with the chosen value, while 
neuronal activity for the non-chosen target was negatively correlated with the chosen 
value in the NPD trials. This negative correlation was led by the inhibition from the 
chosen target to the non-chosen target, while the negative correlation in Figure 4.3 B PD 
trials was led by the inhibition from the non-chosen target to the chosen target.  In 
summary, the results suggest that both chosen value and non-chosen value contributed to 
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the neuronal activity in SEF. The neuronal activity was positively contributed by the 
target in its receptive field, and was inhibited by the targets outside of its receptive field.  
More importantly, the contribution of chosen value and non-chosen value is asymmetric. 
The chosen value had larger effect in terms of both activation and inhibition than the non-
chosen target. This effect is closely linked with the competition process between the two 
options, and will be quantified and discussed further in Chapter 5.  
Figure 4.4 shows the neuronal population activity in no-choice trials and choice 
trials averaging across all 128 task related neurons. The mean average across all the 
neurons shows similar pattern of neuronal activity as comparing to the representative 
neuron. It suggests that the competition in the value space is a general phenomenon in 
SEF rather than occurring only in several representative neurons. 
4.2.4 Competition between direction of the choice options 
In order to visualize the competition between different direction combinations, we 
also systematically varied the non-chosen direction while maintain the chosen direction 
to be the same. Figure 4.5A shows the representative neuronal activity. The neuronal 
activity for both preferred direction and non-preferred direction was the strongest when 
the non-chosen targets were in the contra-lateral hemisphere 180° away (light grey line);  
was medium when the non-chosen targets were in the contralateral hemisphere 90° away 
(grey line); and was lowest when the chosen targets were in the ipsilateral hemisphere 
and 90° away. Although this result is less consistent across population as the effect of 
target value, considering that the directional effect always confounds with the width of 
the receptive field of different neurons (Figure 4.5B). However, the mean activity across 




Figure 4.4 Average neuronal activity across 128 neurons representing different 





Figure 4.5  Directional effect. SEF neuronal activity is modulated by the angular 
position between two targets. The darkness of the line indicate different direction 
combination: when two targets were 180° apart in the different hemisphere (light grey), 
when two targets were 90° apart in the different hemisphere (medium grey), and when 
two targets were 90° apart in the same hemisphere of visual field (black). A: A 





the weakest when the targets were 180 degrees away, and strongest when the targets 
were90 degrees away in the same hemisphere. Overall, the results suggest that there is 
mutual competition not only between the value representation, but it also occurs between 
the directional representation. In another words, in addition to the value information 
competing with each other, the direction information was also in competition with each 
other. Second, the mutual inhibition between neurons has certain directional tuning. The 
further the targets are apart the less inhibition between targets. This result is very 
important since it helps in determining the turning function of mutual inhibition for the 
simulation (section 4.2.7). 
4.2.5 The competition between two options in action value map in SEF 
We next looked at the population activity for all 128 neurons using time-direction 
maps to investigate the temporal dynamics of neuronal activity for each neuron during 
the decision process. In the map, we sorted the neurons according to their preferred 
direction from 0° to 360°(see section 4.1.1). The colors indicate the strength of the 
normalized activity. Assuming that each neuron represented the action value of saccades 
directed towards its preferred direction, the whole activity distribution across the entire 
distribution encodes the combined estimation of the relative value of various saccades 
that the monkey can make. Each vertical line in the map represented the state of this 
activity distribution in the action value map at one moment in time. In our experiment, 
since all targets were presented with the same distance from the center of the screen, we 
then can presume that our spatial map here is one-dimensional (direction). Thus, the 
time-direction map represented the development of action value-related activity over the 
course of decision-making SEF. 
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The map to the left (Figure 4.6A) shows the simple no-choice case with one target 
presented. In response to the target presentation, activity in a broad set of neurons 
increased. Activity centered on the target direction reached a maximum around the time 
of saccade initiation. The map to the right shows the more complex case in which two 
targets were presented. Compared with the time-direction map in the no-choice case, 
there are several differences. First, activity started to rise in two parts of the map. One 
was centered on the target that would be chosen, while the other one was centered on the 
non-chosen target. The initial rise in activity relative to saccade onset started earlier when 
aligned on movement onset, in keeping with the fact that reaction times were longer 
when the monkey had to choose between two response options. At the beginning, the 
activity associated with both possible targets was of similar strength, but around 50 ms 
before saccade onset, a difference developed between these two different groups of cells. 
The activity centered on the chosen target became much stronger than the one centered 
on the non-chosen target and increased until saccade onset.  
Figure4.7 further compares the competition between two targets when the value 
difference between them differed. The chosen value in both conditions was controlled to 
be the same, while the non-chosen value differed. Comparing between two time-direction 
maps, the neuronal activity for the non-chosen target was stronger and lasted longer in 
the small value difference trials than the large value difference trials. The stronger 
neuronal activity for the non-chosen target was due to the larger non-chosen value in the 
small value difference trial, and the longer lasting activity was because of the weaker 
competition. The long lasting activity in the small value difference trial was consistent 




Figure 4.6 Time-direction maps showing population activity in SEF. A:  Time-
direction maps for population activity in SEF in no-choice (one-target , up row) and 
choice (two target, bottom row) aligning on both target onset (left) and saccade onset 
(right). Each horizontal row within the plot represents the average activity of cells with 
preferred direction located at the corresponding direction on direction axis. Colors 
indicate the average change in firing rate relative to the background firing rate. Red 
circles indicate the position for the chosen targets and the black circles indicate the 
position for the non-chosen targets. B:  Comparison between the large value difference 




Figure 4.7 Time-direction maps for comparison between correct and error trials. Up 
row shows the neuronal activity in correct trials. The red circle indicates the position for 
the chosen targets, which were the higher value targets. And the black circle indicates the 
position for the non-chosen targets, which were the lower value targets. Bottom row 
shows the activity in error trials.  The red circle indicates the position for the chosen 
targets, which were the lower value targets, and the black circle indicates the position for 
the non-chosen targets, which were the higher value targets.  
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(Figure 4.1C). Moreover, the activity for the chosen target was also weaker in the small 
value difference trial especially early in the time period (100-150 ms after target onset). 
These results deliberate the competition between neuronal representations of the two 
targets in a large population of SEF neurons.  
However, it is still unclear that whether the neuronal activity here represents the 
average subjective value which was retrieved each time during the decision process, or 
the trial by trial subjective value used for decision.  In order to answer this question, we 
also compared the neuronal activity in the trials when the monkeys chose the large 
subjective value target and small subjective value target (Figure 4.7). In the trial when the 
monkeys chose the larger value target, the time-direction map is similar to the choice 
case (left figure). However, when the monkeys chose smaller value target, the neurons 
activity for the chosen target also increased its firing rate in regardless of the chosen 
target is a low value target. Therefore, the neuronal activity in SEF is more correlated 
with choice or trial based subjective value rather than the average subjective value 
estimated across the recording section (see section 3.2.2).  
The analysis so far is more concerned with the competition between value 
information and/ or competition between directions in a uniform inhibition manner 
without directional tuning. In order to visualize the mutual inhibition in the action space 
with directional tuning, similar analysis can also be performed by comparing different 
direction combinations of the targets. Unfortunately, only a subset of neurons was tested 
with full direction combination. Therefore, there were not enough neurons with different 
preferred direction to create the time-direction maps. 
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Overall, the results suggest that SEF participates or at least represents the 
competition between two options during the value-based decision process. 
4.2.6 The onset manipulation of the competition process 
In order to perturb the decision process, we manipulated the onset difference 
between two targets in a subset of choice trials. As described in section 4.2.1 (Figure 
4.1D), behaviorally and comparing to the normal trial, both monkeys were more likely to 
choose the early onset target while less likely to choose the late onset target. The early 
onset target showed behavior advantages than the late onset target. Therefore, if the 
competition did happen in SEF, we would expect to see similar advantages in neuronal 
activity representing the early onset target relative to those representing the late onset 
target. This was exactly what we found in the SEF.  
Figure 4.8A shows the comparison of a representative neuron's activity in the 
trials when the monkey picked early onset target (early onset trial) and the trials when the 
monkey picked late onset target (late onset trial). The color of the spike density function 
shows whether the chosen target (red) or the non-chosen target (black) was in the 
receptive field. As shown in the carton on the left of the figures, in the trials when the 
monkeys chose the early onset trial, the red line indicates the neuronal activity for the 
chosen target which was the early onset target (as demonstrated in the red block). The 
black line indicates the neuronal activity in the trial when the non-chosen target which 
was the late onset target was in the receptive field (as demonstrated in the red block). If 
assuming the neuronal activity represents the choice option within its receptive field, we 
could consider the neuronal activity in two trial types act as two counter neurons 




Figure 4.8 SEF activity in onset difference trials. A: A representative neuron. Top row 
shows the neuronal activity in early onset trial. Red line shows the neuronal activity for 
the early onset target which was the chosen target. Black line shows the activity to the 
late onset target which was the non-chosen target. Bottom row shows the activity in late 
onset trial. Red line shows the activity for the late onset target which was chosen and 
black line shows the activity to the early onset target which was not chosen. B: The 
average neuronal activity across all neurons. Symbols are same as A. C: Time-direction 
map for the onset difference trials. Up row shows the neuronal activity in early onset trial. 
Bottom row shows the activity in late onset trial.    
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the early onset target therefore increases at the beginning and then was depressed as the 
late onset target increases its activity. The neuronal activity for the early onset target later 
won the competition and the monkey therefore chose the early onset target. Similarly, in 
the trials when the monkey chose the late onset targets, the red line indicates the neuronal 
activity for the late onset target and the black line shows the activity for the early onset 
target. The neuronal activity for the early onset target began to increase early on in the 
trial, however got depressed as the late onset target increased its firing rate. The neuronal 
activity for the late onset target continued to increase across time and won the 
competition for the decision process. The monkey then chose the late onset target. The 
subplots on the left within each figure show the same comparison but now aligned on the 
movement onset. They show that all the activity difference between chosen and non-
chosen target happen before the saccade onset when the monkey indicate their choice by 
eye movements.  
To visualize the activity for the whole action value map in SEF, we did the 
population analysis for the onset different trials and formed the time-direction maps for 
each comparison. As shown in Figure 4.8C, in the trail monkey chose the early onset 
target,  the neurons representing the early onset target activated earlier in time and  
continued to increase firing till the movement onset if the early onset target was chosen 
( up row). In contrary, in the trial when monkey chosen the late onset targets, the 
neuronal activity for the early onset target  increased first and then decreased as the 
activity for the late onset target increased if the late onset target was chosen (bottom row). 
These results again demonstrate that the competition indeed happened between chosen 
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and non-chosen targets in a mutual inhibit way. Moreover, we could manipulate this 
competition or decision process by changing the presenting time of the visual stimulus.  
4.2.7 Simulation of neurophysiologic data 
To prove what we saw in the neuronal activity represent the mutual inhibition 
process for competition, we further used a mean-rate leaky-integrator model (Grossberg, 
1973; Cisek, 2006) to simulate the competition process. The simulated network contained 
200 neurons which were inhibited against each other through lateral inhibition as 
described in the method. The simulation results exhibited many similar phenomena as 
shown in the recordings (Figure 4.9): In the no-choice condition, the simulated neurons 
increased its firing rate as the value of the targets increased. In addition, in the two-choice 
condition, the simulated firing rate correlated with both chosen and non-chosen values in 
both preferred and non-preferred direction of the neuron (Figure 4.9A), which is very 
similar to the real neuronal activity (Figure 4.3 and 4.4).  Furthermore, we looked at the 
activity for the whole simulated population. Similar to the real neurophysiological 
recording, the simulated time-direction map shows that neurons with the preferred 
direction near the target direction got activated in the no-choice trial. In the choice-trial, 
the simulated neurons with preferred directions consistent with both the chosen target 
direction and non-chosen target direction got activated (Figure 4.9B). In the simulated 
time-direction map, the activity for both target were equally activated at the early stage. 
Later on, while the activity for the chosen target increased, the activity for the non-chosen 
target became gradually depressed. To further look at the competition process, we also 
did the simulation for small value difference and large value difference trial. As shown in 




Figure 4.9  Simulation results. A. Simulated neuronal activity in no-choice trial (left 
two columns), choice trial when controlling chosen value to be the same (middle two 
columns) or controlling non-chosen value to be the same (left two columns). B. 
Simulated time-direction maps for no-choice trial (top row) and choice trial (bottom 
row).Colors indicate the strength of activity. C. Simulated time-direction maps for small 




determined by value difference between two targets. The smaller the value difference was 
the longer the competition process lasted. The similarity between the simulated results 
and real recording suggests competition process with mutual inhibition happened in SEF. 
4.3 Discussion 
4.3.1 Non divisive normalization in SEF 
This chapter focuses on describing the competitive process between choice 
options.  We observed a non-divisive normalization pattern of neuronal activity in SEF  
when comparing the neuronal activity in choice trials with that from the no-choice trials. 
This result suggests that coding mechanism in SEF is different from many other cortical 
areas in the sensory systems (Shapley and Victor, 1978; Bonin et al., 2005), the motor 
systems (Basso and Wurtz, 1998), and higher order processes such as multisensory 
integration (Ohshiro et al., 2011), visual attention (Reynolds and Heeger, 2009) or even 
decision-making (Louie et al., 2011; Louie et al., 2013). The non-divisive normalization 
may suggest that SEF is functionally important during decision-making process, which 
frees the cortical area from the general efficient encoding mechanism of information in 
the cortical maps (Louie et al., 2013). This non-devisive normalization pattern may 
contribute to better signal to noise ratio for neuronal coding during the decision-making 
process, and preserve the chosen value information in a “transitive” way. 
4.3.2 Competition between two choice options in SEF 
Action-value signal is of central importance in selecting an appropriate action 
during value base decision-making (Rangel et al., 2008; Kable and Glimcher, 2009).  It 
links value representation to action representation. Action-value signal have been 
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reported in DLPF (Kobayashi et al., 2002; Kennerley and Wallis, 2009), SEF 
(Wunderlich et al., 2009, So and Stuphorn, 2010) and caudate (Lau and Glimcher, 2008). 
However the action value in different cortical area may serve different functions during 
value based decision process. Whether and how the action value signal in SEF 
dynamically contributes to the value based decision process is still unknown. 
The results from this chapter suggest that action value in SEF represents the 
competition between two options in a mutual inhibition way. To visualize the 
competition in value representation and direction representation separately, we looked at 
the value competition and direction competition by controlling either value or direction of 
one target to be constant, and let the value or direction of the other target varies. We 
found that not only did the value representation of the targets exhibit mutual inhibition on 
each other, the directional information also competed with each other in a directional way. 
Ideally, a rational value based choice should not be influenced by directional information. 
However consistent with previous research in pre-motor cortex (Pastor-Bernier and Cisek, 
2011), we did find the spatial distance between two options exerting an effect on the 
decision process. Specifically, the mutual inhibition between different neurons has 
directional tuning. The mutual inhibition is weaker if the distance between the targets is 
larger. These results suggest that the competition process during decision-making process 
occurs both in value space and in direction space. Therefore, SEF is less likely to be a 
path way which is merely modulated by the input value information in the decision-
making process. These observations together support the idea that rather than being a 
downstream motor area which simply is in charge of motor control, SEF participates or at 
least represents the decision-making process.  
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The competition processes in both value space and action space will be further 
quantified in the next chapter. The causal role of SEF rather than correlation will be 






Chapter 5  
Cascade Process between Value and 
Direction Representation 
After discussing the competition process between two targets in the previous 
chapter, this chapter will focus on the investigation of the temporal dynamics of the 
transition process between value information and direction information. We dissociated 
the competition of value and of direction embedded in the same neuronal activity using 
different analysis techniques. The results from different methods support the same idea 
that in SEF, competition between option values occurs earlier than competition between 
directions in our behavior paradigm. 
5.1 Specific Methods 
5.1.1 Classification analysis 
Binary linear classification was performed using Matlab toolboxes and custom 
codes. The analysis was performed using neuronal activity 200ms before movement onset 
till 20ms after neuron onset at 1ms time resolution. For each neuron at given time bin, we 
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used the neuronal activity in part of the choice trials to train the classifier, and then used 
the trained classifier to predict either the direction of the chosen target or the value of the 
chosen target for each trial. Specifically, when predicting the chosen direction, we first 
determined the two targets’ location in a choice trial. We then used the neuronal activity 
in all choice trials where the monkey chose one of the target locations regardless of the 
non-chosen location and its value, to train the classifier. This optimized classifier was 
then used to predict which of the target position was chosen based on the observed 
neuronal activity in each trial. Similarly when predicting the chosen value, we trained the 
classifier using the neuronal activity from all chosen trial where the monkey chose one of 
the target value regardless of the non-chosen value and the direction positions .This 
trained classifier was then used to predict which target was chosen among the two 
possible options. We performed the classification for every 1 ms time bin during the trial. 
The classification accuracy was calculated by averaging across all trials for each neuron.  
Next, a permutation test which shuffled the chosen and the non-chosen direction or value 
of all trials for 100 times, was used to test whether the classification accuracy was 
significant (p<0.05). If the classification result is better than the 5th highest classification 
accuracy in the permutation test, we consider the result to be significant. 
5.1.2 Mutual information analysis 
In order to compare the relative strength of saccade value and direction, we 
calculated separately for each neuron the mutual information between neuronal activity 
and value/direction.   
To reduce bias in estimating the mutual information, we discretized the neuronal 
activities so that each bin could hold equal number of trials.  We set the number of bins 
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for neuronal activity (NF) as four.  The boundaries between the bins were fixed across all 
time windows.  At each particular time window, we collected the mean neuronal firing 
rates (F) from every trial.  Neuronal activity below first quartile (Q1) was classified as F1, 
between Q1 and Q2 as F2, between Q2 and Q3 as F3, and lastly the neuronal activity above 
Q3 was classified as F4.  
The mutual information between the neuronal activity F and the variable X, which 
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where 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  was the number of trials having both 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖and X𝑗𝑗 ;𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖· was the number of trials 
having Fi; and 𝑀𝑀·𝑗𝑗was the number of trials having Xj.  M was the number of total trials.  
As mentioned before, we set NF, the number of distinct states of neuronal activity, to four. 
In the case of direction, we set Nx, the number of distinct states of the relevant variable, 
to four, because we tested four different saccade directions. For value, we tested 7 
different values.  However, distinguishing 7 different value levels would have resulted in 
different maximum amounts of mutual information for the two variables (direction: 2 bits; 
value: ≤ 2.8 bits).  This would have led to an overestimation of value information relative 
to directional information.  In order to make the value and direction information 
estimations directly comparable, we also set Nx for value to be four as well.  In grouping 
the 7 different values into four bins, we followed the same binning procedure as we did 
for the neuronal activities. So that each bin held approximately equal number of trials.  







Bias           (3.5) 
where UFX was the number of nonzero Mij’s for all i and j, UF was the number of nonzero 
M.i for all i, and UX was the number of nonzero Mi. for all j.  This procedure followed the 
approach described in Ito and Doya (2009). 
Finally, we performed a permutation procedure to test whether the amount of 
mutual information was significant, and to further reduce any remaining bias. We 
generated a random set of Fi and Xj pairs, by permuting both F and X arrays respectively.  
We calculated the mutual information between F and X, using the same method described 
above, and repeated this process for 100 times.  The mean of the mutual information 
obtained from these 100 random processes represented remaining bias and was subtracted 
from I(F,X).  To test whether the final estimated mutual information was significant (p < 
0.05), we compared it with the 6th highest information obtained from the 100 random 
processes.  If it was non-significant, we set the mutual information to zero.  The bias 
reductions sometimes led to negative estimates of mutual information.  In that case, we 
also set the final estimated information to be zero. 
5.1.3 Regression analysis 
A linear regression was used to determine the temporal contribution of chosen 
target and non-chosen target to the neuronal firing rate in choice trials. First, for each 
neuron, we calculated the mean firing rate on no-choice trials for each direction and 
chosen values (𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜�������������(𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑓𝑓) ). Then, in the regression analysis, we 
tested three descriptive models: 
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Model1: 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 (𝑓𝑓) = 𝑏𝑏0                                                                                        (7) 
Model2: Schoice (t) = b1Sno−chocie�������������(Vchosen , Dchosen , t)                                         (8) 
Model3: 𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 (𝑓𝑓) = 𝑏𝑏1𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜�������������(𝑉𝑉𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝐷𝐷𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑓𝑓) 
                                                      +𝑏𝑏2𝑆𝑆𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜−𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜�������������(𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ,𝐷𝐷𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑐𝑐 ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 , 𝑓𝑓)                          (9) 
Model 1 is a simple baseline model, where 𝑏𝑏0 is a constant. Model 2 evaluates the 
contribution of the chosen target to the firing rate. Model 3 evaluates the contribution of 
both chosen target and non-chosen target to the firing rate based on neuron's firing rate in 
the no-choice trial.  The data were fitted with linear least-squares fitting routine 
implemented in Matlab ( The Math Works, Natick, MA) to minimize the sum of squared 
deviation between observed and predicted values. BIC was used to determine the best 
model for each neuron. After the BIC test, a permutation procedure was performed to test 
whether the coefficient for the chosen and non-chosen target were significant. In the 
permutation test, neuronal activity was assigned in each trial with permutated chosen 
value and permutated non-chosen value. The difference between the chosen and non-
chosen coefficient was calculated using the same method described above for 1000 times. 
To compare whether the estimated difference between chosen and non-chosen coefficient 
was significant, a two-tailed test was used, by comparing it with the 25 highest 
differences and 25 lowest differences from the 1000 permutation process. The first 
differential time, onset time, was defined as the first time when the chosen coefficients 




5.2.1 Temporal sequence between chosen value and chosen direction 
To answer whether there are any temporal differences between the development 
of chosen value and chosen direction information, we performed a trial by trial analysis 
using linear classification to decode the monkeys’ chosen direction and chosen value 
from the firing rate with 1 ms temporal resolution. This method allowed us to ask the 
question of whether and when did one type of chosen target information appear in the 
neuronal activity and how it develop over time. Figure 5.1A shows the average 
classification accuracy which was significantly better than random averaging across all 
128 task-related neurons (see method). The red line indicates the significant classification 
accuracy for the chosen value. The black line is for the chosen direction. The results 
demonstrate that neuronal activity in SEF predict both chosen value and chosen direction 
better than chance. When aligned with saccade onset, the time point where the activity 
allowed us to predict chosen value better than random (around 160 ms before saccade 
onset) was much earlier than the time for predicting saccade direction (around 60 ms 
before saccade onset). After the early peak for chosen value prediction, the classification 
accuracy for chosen value gradually decreased while the accuracy of prediction for 
direction increased over time. Figure 5.1B further explicates the number of neurons 
showing significant classification accuracy as a function of time. Consistent with the 
temporal dynamic of the classification accuracy, there was larger proportion of neurons 
showing significantly better prediction accuracy than random for chosen value than 




Figure 5.1 Temporal sequence between value and direction information. A: Time 
course of classification accuracy for both value (red) and direction (black) aligned on and 
saccade onset. B: The number of neurons showing significant classification for both 
value and direction. C: Comparison between chosen and non-chosen information for both 
value (up row) and direction (bottom row). D: Comparison between chosen and non-
chosen correlation coefficients in the regression analysis for both value (up row) and 
direction (bottom row).   
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The similar analysis can also be done in the high dimension space, in which the 
neuronal activity for each neuron represents one feature dimension. The trajectory of the 
population activity, determined by the neurons recorded simultaneously, changed as the 
neuronal activity developed. Figure 5.2A shows the principle component of the neuronal 
activity for four different trajectories representing four different chosen directions. Figure 
5.2 B shows the mean average of classification results from all the recording assemblies. 
Consistent with the single neuronal analysis, the decoding result from neuron assembles 
using support vector machine (SVM) shows similar temporal sequence between value 
information and direction information. However, the prediction accuracy using the 
neuronal assembles is much higher than using the single unit, (see figure 5.2B and figure 
5.1A). 
5.2.2 Mutual value and direction information 
The classification results suggest there is temporal difference between the 
appearance of chosen direction and chosen value information. However, this analysis is 
more about the temporal difference between the result of competition for value and 
direction, rather than the dynamic difference between competition process in value space 
and direction space. Therefore, we also performed mutual information analysis to 
compare the value and direction information for both chosen and non-chosen targets.  We 
focused on the difference between the chosen and non-chosen information, which is 
directly correlated with the competition process between chosen and non-chosen options. 
We used 106 neurons (26 from monkey A and 80 from monkey I) out of the 128 neurons 
for this analysis. These 106 neurons are those we tested with 8-12 direction combinations 




Figure 5.2 Neuronal dynamics within a neuronal state space and results of SVM 
classifier. A. The activity of the simultaneously recorded neurons defined a 10-
dimensional state space.  A projection of this state space onto a 2-dimensional subspace 
is shown. The subspace is defined by the first two principal components (PC1, PC2) 
explaining variance in the neuronal state vector distribution. The temporal succession of 
the mean state vector location between target and saccade onset is shown separately for 
trials in which one of four saccade directions was chosen by the monkey. The mean state 
vector locations form a trajectory (T1: blue, T2: black, T3: violet, T4: red line). The 
green dot on the trajectories indicates the moment of saccade initiation. B. SVM analysis 
of the distribution of state vectors for all combination of saccade directions and value was 
performed. The percentage of correctly predicted choices based on this analysis is plotted 
as a function of the time bin during which the state vectors were defined, showing the 
mean classification accuracy of all recording sections. The shaded color indicates the 




combination, where the two target were exactly opposite to each other. Therefore, the 
chosen direction and non-chosen direction information for these 22 neurons could be 
confounded and these neurons were excluded from the analysis.  
The mutual information analysis (Figure 5.1 B) shows that, first, value and 
direction information for both chosen target and non-chosen target were represented in 
the neuronal activity. Second, the chosen target information was significantly stronger 
than non-chosen target information later on in the decision process. Third, consistent with 
the classification analysis, the onset time when chosen value information significantly 
differed from non-chosen value information (-116 ms before saccade onset) was 57ms 
earlier than the onset time when different chosen direction information significantly 
differed from non-chosen direction information (-59 ms). These results suggest that SEF 
not only represented the result of the competition as quantified by the classification, it 
also reflected the two choice options and the competition process between them in both 
value and direction domain. While the chosen direction and value information grew 
stronger across time, the non-chosen direction and value information gradually decreased.  
Note that the result profiles differed between two different analyses. This is 
possibly because of the different questions asked in each analysis. In the classification 
analysis, we wanted to know whether we can successfully predict which target the 
monkey chose (target value or target direction) other than the other target based on the 
chosen value/direction information embedded in neuronal activity. In the mutual 
information analysis, we sought to determine which of the four different values (see 
method) or directions was for either chosen or non-chosen targets.  Moreover, the 
sensitivity to different type of information also differs for different techniques. For 
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example, for the classification analysis, it has only one decision threshold for binary 
classification. But the threshold can be placed in the optimal place according to the 
training sample. This analysis is easier to pick up option value information than action 
value information. For the information analysis, it divides the data into more parts, 
However, the way for data division is predetermined (Wallisch et al., 2010), rather than 
being in the most proper place as in the classification analysis. Therefore, the information 
analysis can be more sensitive in some cases (such as detecting action value), but less 
sensitive in other cases (such as detecting option value). 
5.3 Competition process in both value representation and direction 
representation in SEF  
We used regression analysis to further quantify the mutual inhibition process 
between the chosen and non-chosen target. In the analysis, we used the neuronal activity 
in the no-choice trial with targets of both chosen and non-chosen targets (same value and 
direction) as the independent variables, and the neuron activity in the choice trial as the 
dependent variable.  Compare with previous literatures (Cai et al., 2011; So and Stuphorn, 
2011), this method allows us to estimate the turning of direction and value based on the 
neuronal activity in no-choice trial rather than assuming the tuning function empirically 
in the regression analysis. It reduces the chance of incorrectly predetermine the type of 
turning function, as well as the number of parameters needed to be estimated in the 
regression model.  
Figure 5.1D shows the comparison between the correlation coefficient of both 
chosen target and non-chosen target for both value and direction. Consistent with 
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previous results, as the competition continued, the correlation coefficient for the chosen 
value gradually rise above the average, while the correlation coefficient for the non-
chosen value gradually dropped below the average. Although the decrease in correlation 
coefficient for non-chosen target was less pronounced for value than for direction, the 
mutual inhibition between the two options is still visible. The regression analysis again 
confirms that difference between chosen and non-chosen value (-116ms) appear earlier 
than difference between chosen and non-chosen direction (-59 ms). 
5.4 Discussion 
This chapter focuses on the temporal difference between the competition in value 
representation and in direction representation. The classification results demonstrate that 
the chosen value information appears earlier than the chosen target information in SEF 
during value based decision-making process. Mutual information analysis and regression 
analysis further elaborate the competition process between chosen target and non-chosen 
target by comparing the relative strength for both targets. All together, the results suggest 
two important aspects as discussed in following. 
First, the results suggest that the competition process occurs in both value space 
and direction space. In chapter 4, we did observe strong mutual competition in value 
domain and weak competition with directional tuning in direction domain. However even 
though the competition process can be represented in SEF, it is still possible that the 
neuronal activity in SEF was merely driven or modulated by the competition process 
from the input in value space. That is, SEF only serves as a relay point mapping the value 
information to the corresponding target direction. If this is true, we should observe that 
both value space and direction space competition occurring simultaneously, or value 
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space competition occurring earlier but with similar profile as in direction space. 
However the results showed temporal difference between these two competitions and 
difference in their profile arguing against this possibility. It is very likely that the 
competition in the value domain can occur in OFC, vmPFC, or ACC (Padoa-Schioppa, 
2011), and then project onto SEF. The neuronal activity in SEF with directional tuning 
compete with each other, and then biases the competition process in motor domain which 
can take place in frontal or parietal cortical area or through cortical-basal ganglia loop 
(Cisek, 2007; Kable and Glimcher, 2009). 
Second, these results argue against the action based hypothesis in its pure form 
(Cisek, 2007, 2012). If the action based hypothesis in its pure form is true, we should see 
the chosen direction information appearing earlier than the chosen value information 
since the competition in the action space is the only precursor before choice. However, 
the results from all three different analyses suggest that the competition in value space 
occurs earlier than the competition in the action space. Therefore, it is less likely that the 
competition process only takes place within motor representation.  
Based on these results, we suggest a cascade hypothesis of decision-making, in 
which competitions in both the value space and the direction space take plac. The 
competition in the value space can bias the competition process in the action space. In our 
experiment paradigm, the competition in the direction representation was balanced at the 
beginning after targets were presented, since the information for all the targets were 
equally strong without value information. As shown in the Figure 5.1D, the regression 
correlation coefficients for both chosen and non-chosen target increase equally at the 
beginning of the competition.  However, the competition in the value representation was 
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imbalanced, since the value of different options differed.  This imbalanced competition in 
the value space then led to the generation of chosen value information, and biases the 
competition process in the action space. The cascade hypothesis will be discussed further 






Chapter 6  
Causal Relation between SEF and Value 
based Choice Behavior 
In the previous two chapters, we have discussed the correlation between SEF 
neuronal activity and choice behavior exhibited by monkeys. In this chapter, we seek to 
test if there is causal relation between the neuronal activity and the monkeys' behavior 
through perturbing SEF using cryogenic deactivation.  
6.1 Specific Methods 
6.1.1 The cryogenic deactivation 
The cooling or cryogenic deactivation technique of cortical area can be traced 
back to 1960 (Dondey et al., 1962). Cryotips (Skinner and Lindsley, 1968; Zhang et al., 
1986), cooling plates (Schiller and Malpeli, 1977; Sandell and Schiller, 1982; Michalski 
et al., 1993) and cryoloops (Salsbury and Horel, 1983; Lomber et al., 1999; Long and Fee, 
2008; Koval et al., 2011) have been used in different cooling experiments. SEF is a 
surface cortical structure that is relatively large and smooth in area. Therefore, cooling 
plate is the ideal method for deactivating this cortical area. 
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Two most common forms of reversible inactivation techniques are 
pharmacological and cryogenic or cooling. Compared to pharmaco-chemical deactivation, 
cooling has several advantages (Lomber, 1999). First, cooling can simultaneously 
deactivate a relatively larger area, which often requires multiple injections to achieve the 
same effect using chemical deactivation. Second, repeated chemical inactivation of a 
particular region in brain often results in permanent damage that cannot be reversed. 
Thirdly, the size of the inactivation locus is easier to replicate between different 
deactivating agents. Considering these advantages, we employed the cooling technique 
instead of pharmacology to perturb the activity in SEF. 
In this experiment, cooling plates were used to inactivate the SEF bilaterally or 
unilaterally. The location of SEF was determined by the electrophysiological recording 
where saccade related activity was recorded (Figure 3.2). The size of the cooling plate is 
10mm from anterior to posterior, and 12mm from left to right. For unilateral cooling, in 
which either left or right hemisphere SEF was cooled, the plate is 10 mm from anterior to 
posterior and 6mm from medial to lateral.  In those experiments, the left or right 
hemisphere was alternately cooled across experiment sections. 
Room temperature methanol was pumped through Teflon tubing that passed 
through a dry ice bath, in which methanol was reduced to subzero temperature. Chilled 
methanol was then pumped through a cryoloop. The cryoloop was attached to a stainless 





Figure 6.1 The cryogenic deactivation.  A: Cooling plate used to deactivate SEF. B: 
Target set for the new gamble experiment.  
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cortical area. The methanol was returned to the same reservoir from which it came to 
form a closed loop. The cortical temperature on the dura was monitored by an attached 
micro-thermocouple. At the same time, two electrodes were recording simultaneously 
inboth left and right hemispheres SEF to monitor the neuronal activity. A total of over 30 
blocks of data in each section were obtained. During each session, monkeys initially 
performed the task for 10-15 min in normal state, and then the SEF region was 
deactivated bilaterally for 10-15 min by pumping chilled methanol through the cryoloop 
while the task continued.  After that, the cortical temperature returned to normal for 
another 10-15 min as the cooling device was turned off. This whole process was then 
repeated at least 3 times over 900 trials. 
6.1.2 Time frequency analysis 
Time-frequency analysis was performed using the matching pursuit (MP) 
algorithm (Mallat and Zhang, 1993). Matching pursuit has been used previously to 
analyze LFPs (Ray et al., 2008a; Chen et al., 2010). It is a procedure for computing 
adaptive signal representations and can eliminate all cross terms of the Wigner 
distribution of the signal. The Gabor function dictionaries used in MP provide the best 
time-frequency resolution possible in agreement with the uncertainty principle. The 
multi-scale decomposition of MP allows sharp transients in the LFP signal to be 
represented by functions that have narrow temporal support, rather than oscillatory 
functions with a temporal support of hundreds of milliseconds (such as in Short Time 
Fourier Transform in time-frequency analysis, multi-tapering for spectrum analysis) (Ray 
et al., 2008a; Ray et al., 2008b). 
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The algorithm is an iterative procedure that selects a set of Gabor functions 
(atoms) from a redundant dictionary of functions that constitute the best possible 
description of the original signal. Time-frequency plots were then obtained by calculating 
the Wigner distribution of every atom and taking the weighted sum. All computations 
were performed using MATLAB (Mathworks, Natick, MA). We performed the MP 
computation using custom MATLAB scripts and the free software toolbox ‘LastWave’ 
[http://www.cmap.polytechnique.fr/~bacry/LastWave/], developed by Emmanuel Bacry. 
The LFP signal was sampled at 1 kHz and was analyzed in 900 separate 1 ms time 
bins. For stimulus-related activity, we examined the LFP signal in the 900 ms time 
interval starting at 300ms before target onset. For movement related activity, we 
examined the 900 ms time interval starting at 500 ms before movement onset. Matching 
pursuit yields a 430×615 array of time-frequency values (with a time resolution of ~1.5 
ms, frequency resolution of ~0.35 Hz). 
6.1.3 The new target gamble task 
In a subset of the inactivation experiment, we performed new gamble experiments 
using seven different gamble cues which the monkeys had never seen before (Figure 
6.1B). This was done to differentiate the cooling effect between the habituate system and 
the goal-direct system. In those sections, we reversed the position for the maximum 
reward and the minimum reward, while maintaining the rule in the same way. The colors 
cyan, red, blue, and green represent 1, 3, 5, and 9 units of water respectively. The 




6.2.1 Neuronal response to cool temperature: Action potentials 
By cooling down the temperature in SEF, we temporarily and reversibly 
deactivated this cortical area by slowing down its metabolism. Figure 6.2 shows a 
representative recording in one section. In the experiment, the cooling sections were
interleaved with normal temperature sections. The cooling sections lasted around 15-
20mins each time.  As the cooling device turned on (first row), cortical temperature on 
the dura above SEF gradually went down within 1-2 minutes. The neuron in both 
hemisphere (forth row: left hemisphere; fifth row: right hemisphere) decreased their 
firing rates as the temperature dropped and were almost diminished at around 5°C. 
Throughout the experiment, the neuronal activity returned to normal level every time 
after the temperature returned to normal temperature range (37-38 °C). This is despite the 
fact that reversible deactivation occurred 14 times and lasted around 4 hours. Note that 
the deactivation of the right hemisphere was weaker than the left hemisphere in this 
recording section. This is because the recording position in right hemisphere was deeper 
than that in the left hemisphere. Figure 6.3 summarize the neuronal activity as a function 
of both the depth of recording position and the temperature above dura. As shown in the 
figure, neuronal activity always decreased with decreasing temperature or shallow 
recording position. In all of the behavior analysis, we only included the data when the 
dura temperature was below 15 Celsius which is considered as the cooling condition.  As 
shown in the figure, at this temperature range, even the neurons in the infra-granular layer 
reduced their firing rate to approximately 30% of their normal firing rate. Therefore, the 
majority of the neurons in SEF were inactivated under the cooling condition. 
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Figure 6.2 A representative cooling section. The first row shows the turning on and off 
of the cooling device. The second row shows the cortical temperature recorded above 
durra. The third and forth rows show the neuronal activity recorded simultaneously in 




Figure 6.3 Neuronal activity as a function of temperature above the dura and depth 
of recording. Color in the right plot indicates the strength of the activity compared to the 





6.2.2 Neuronal response to cool temperature: Local field potential 
In addition to action potential, we also measured the local field potential during 
cooling situation. Currently the origin of LFP is still under debate. Different literatures 
have different hypotheses about the local field potential in different frequency band 
(Buzsaki et al., 2012; Reimann et al., 2013). The cooling technique provides us with an 
ideal perturbation technique to probe how the energy distribution across different bands 
will change when the frequency of action potentials is modulated. 
Figure 6.4 shows a representative recording. The color maps in both subplots 
represent the energy distribution of LFP as a function of both time and energy. The black 
line overlaid indicates the neuronal activity recorded simultaneously. In the normal 
condition, after target onset, the firing rate increased and peaked around the time before 
the saccade movements. The cooling condition, in contrary, showed no such pattern in 
firing rate, and even the baseline firing rate was greatly reduced as shown in figure 6.4B. 
The energy distribution of LFP, on the other hand, did not show any difference between 
the two conditions. After the target onset, energy in the gamma and high gamma range 
began to increase together with the increasing firing rate of action potential. The beta 
band activity also increased from negative to zero. The fact that cooling had a bigger 
impact on action potential rather than LFP suggest that the energy distribution of LFP is 
more related to the synaptic input to the neuron rather than the action potential output. 
The action potential output is more closely linked to the metabolism of neurons, which 





Figure 6.4 Comparison of LFP energy distribution in normal (A) and cooling (B) 
conditions. The LFP energy distribution was plotted as a function a time and frequency. 




6.2.3 The effect of SEF deactivation on choice probability 
In order to test the causal relation between monkeys' choice and neuronal activity, 
we further compared monkeys' choice function in cooling situation and normal situation. 
Figure 6.5 (top row) shows both Monkey A's and Monkey I's choice performances in 
gamble paradigm when their SEF were bilaterally cooled down in the cooling sections. 
Comparing the normal condition (blue bars) with the cooling condition (red bars), both 
monkeys made significantly more mistakes (Monkey A: paired t-test, df=99, p=0.002; 
Monkey I: paired t-test, df=99, p=0.01) during the cooling sections. The increase of error 
was largest for intermediate value difference. This is probably due to the fact that there is 
a ceiling effect for very small value-difference comparisons. Whereas for very large 
value differences, the decision is so easy that other brain regions besides the SEF are 
sufficient to select the better option. 
We did observe a significant difference between normal condition and cooling 
condition. However, as shown in the figures, the monkeys were still able to made 
reasonable choices most of the time. Considering that both monkeys were trained on the 
tasks for approximately a year, we reasoned that the habitual system can also participate 
in the task, and therefore compensate for the perturbation effect on the goal directed 
system. In order to weaken the participation of habitual system during the decision 
process, we created a gamble experiments with a new set of target cues which the 
monkeys were never trained with (Figure 6.1B). As expected, the effect of cooling in the 
new gamble experiments was more pronounced. Both monkeys (Monkey A: paired t-test, 
df=49, p=0.003; Monkey I: paired t-test, df=59, p=0.002) showed more mistakes in 




Figure 6.5 Choice probability affected by cooling. A. The probability of choosing the 
smaller value target in choice trial was plotted as a function of subjective value 
differences of two options for both monkeys. The behavior under normal conditions is 
shown by the blue bars (normal temperature; 37 ºC). The behavior when SEF is 
inactivated in both hemispheres is shown by the red bars (~10 ºC). B. Contour plot of 
choice probability between any two of the target pairs. The targets’ numbers were sorted 
by their subjective values in the normal temperature condition. The colors indicate the 
choice probability. The top row shows the choice probability in both gamble tasks for 
both monkeys in the normal condition. The bottom row shows the monkeys' choices 




only did the monkeys make more mistakes in small value difference trials, they also 
tended to make more mistakes in relatively large value difference trials. Figure 6.5B 
shows the choice probability contour comparing each pair among 7 targets in both 
gamble and new gamble experiments. The order of the target was sorted by the subjective 
value in the normal condition, and therefore was the same for both normal and cooling 
conditions. The result further confirms the monkeys’ tendency to show more randomness 
in choices selection instead of changing their preference when SEF was inactivated. As 
shown in the figure, the preference of the targets was almost consistent between the 
normal and cooling situation. However, the border area along the diagonal axis is much 
wider in the cooling condition than in the normal condition. This indicates that the mean 
subjective value of the targets were consistent across both conditions. However, the 
standard deviations of the subjective values were larger in cooling condition than that in 
normal condition.  
6.2.4 Unilateral deactivation 
In order to test whether the cooling effect is local, we carried out a set of 
unilateral cooling experiments. In these experiments, only SEF on one hemisphere 
(Monkey A: 3 sections on left side and 2 sections on right side; Monkey B: 3 sections on 
left side and 4 sections on right side) was inactivated while the other SEF on the opposite 
hemisphere maintained its normal function. The unilateral cooling experiments were also 
done using the new target gamble experiment.  
To quantify the imbalance effect led by unilateral cooling, we divided the trials 
into incongruent trials and congruent trials based on whether or not the high value target 
was on the contra lateral side of inactivation: In the congruent trial, the high value target 
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was on the unaffected side of visual field. Therefore, the low value targets had weaker 
neuronal representation and the value competition was congruent with the inactivation 
effect.  Conversely in the incongruent trial, the higher value target was on the affected 
side of visual field. Consequently, the higher value target had weaker neuronal 
representation. The value competition is incongruent with the inactivation effect. Both 
monkeys showed significantly more errors in the incongruent trials than in the congruent 
trials (Monkey A: paired t-test, df=49, p=0.005; Monkey I: paired t-test, df=69,  p=0.036, 
Figure 6.6). The error rates for normal temperature condition always fell in between the 
congruent condition and incongruent condition.  These results reflect the imbalance in 
contribution to the competition process by the affected and the unaffected SEF due to the 
unilateral inactivation. Therefore, the results support a local effect from cooling. 
6.3 Discussion 
6.3.1 Dissociation between action potential and LFP 
Any excitable membrane, whether it is a spine dendrite, soma, axon or axon 
terminal, and any type of transmembrane current can contribute to the extracellular field. 
However, it is less clear which are the most important factors. While some researches 
consider cooperative postsynaptic activity (Mitzdorf, 1985; Linden et al., 2011), cellular-
synaptic architectural organization of the network and synchrony of the current source 
(Buzsaki et al., 2012) as the most important factors of LFP, others argue that the active 
currents and not synaptic input dominate the generation of LFPs (Reimann et al., 2013). 
Many researches haves also shown spike "contamination" of the LFP (Rasch et al., 2008; 
Zanos et al., 2011). However, by deactivating SEF, our results demonstrate that even as 




Figure 6.6 Choice probability affected by unilateral cooling for two monkeys. The 
probability of choosing the smaller value target in the choice trial was plotted as a 
function of subjective value differences of two options for both monkeys. The behavior in 
congruent trial, in which the unaffected side is congruent with the higher value target side, 
is shown by the grey. The behavior in incongruent trial, in which the unaffected side is on 




bands is still similar to the distribution from when the action potential was present. This 
suggests that, spike "contamination" cannot be a major influence on LFP energy 
distribution, at least in SEF. LFP including the high frequency band is largely determined 
by the synaptic input or postsynaptic potentials and other non-spike-related membrane 
voltage fluctuations (Nicholson and Freeman, 1975; Ray and Maunsell, 2010; Belluscio 
et al., 2012). 
The fact that LFP is more dependent on synaptic input rather than the action 
potential output from SEF as suggested by the cooling results, highlight the importance of 
LFP analysis. In this way, LFP analysis provided a possible way to investigate the 
information flow rather than information repetition of a certain cortical area. LFP 
analysis could potentially dissociate the information of synaptic input from other cortical 
areas and the information led by local computation. 
6.3.2 Causal role of SEF in value based decision-making 
Action value neurons have been found in SEF during no-choice trials in a 
experiment similar to this dissertation study (So and Stuphorn, 2010). As reported, the 
neuronal activity was not only tuned by saccade direction, but also modulated by the 
reward amount of the targets. The human imaging literature also supports this finding. 
Specifically, the imaging research found action value signal in medium frontal area in 
general, whereas saccade related action value was coded in SEF and arm movement 
related action value was coded in SMA (Wunderlich et al., 2009). The dissertation 
research in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 also demonstrated how the action value can correlate 
with the decision process. However, these findings which correlate neuronal activity with 
decision process could not determine if there is causal relationship between the function 
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role of SEF and choice behavior (Teller, 1984). Therefore, in this chapter, by using a 
perturbation experiment, we were testing the causal role of SEF in decision-making.  
The result shows that inactivation of neuronal activity in SEF leads to increase of 
monkeys' error rate in choice behavior. Moreover, several reasons make it unlikely that 
this increase of error rate can explained by a deficiency in the movement generation. First, 
previous research shows that, unlike FEF, SEF lesion usually produced a mild 
impairment on the contra-lateral side or even no impairment in visually guided or single 
memory-guided saccades (Gaymard et al., 1990; Schiller and Chou, 1998). Second, in the 
no-choice trial, during cooling, the monkeys never showed any directional difficulty 
choosing any targets. This suggests that the monkeys did not have motor difficulties in a 
simple visual triggered task. Third, if the deficiency is due to the generation of the 
movement, we should see the error rate increase equally strong for both easy choice 
comparison and difficult choice comparison. Therefore, a motor deficit should lead to a 
global increase of the error rate rather than a change of the slope of the choice function 
(Figure 6.5). Considering all these reasons, we conclude that the increase of error rate 
during cooling was due to difficulties in making a choice rather than in the generation of 
movements. 
The results of the new targets gamble show that, when the monkeys were less 
familiar with the targets, their choice selection became more inconsistent once SEF was 
inactivated. This is in line with the idea that SEF plays a causal role in goal-directed 
decision-making. In the new gamble task, the decision depended more on the goal 
directed system than on the habitual system. Therefore, cooling down SEF had a larger 
effect on choice behavior. Nevertheless, although the influence of inactivation on choice 
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behavior were significant, we still observed that both monkeys could make relatively 
rational choices in the new gamble experiment instead of just random decisions. This 
phenomenon can be explained in several ways. One possibility is that, even though the 
new target gamble task required more involvement of the goal directed system, the 
habituate system still participated to some degree. For example, in the new gamble 
experiment, the monkey can still use color cues without estimating the subjective value of 
all the targets. For instance they can always choose a green-containing target with larger 
maximum value rather than a blue-containing target. Since both monkeys showed strong 
risk seeking behavior under normal condition, the choice behavior would be similar 
under the cooling condition even if the monkeys used simple color mapping rules to 
make choices. In order to rule out this possibility, future experiment should use 
completely different target cues (such as different pictures) to train the monkey shortly 
and then test the cooling effect. Doing this can possibly prevent the simple mapping 
between certain feature dimension to specific choice. Another possible explanation would 
be that SEF is only part of a larger network participating in coding action value. There 
are other cortical areas such as DLPFC (Kobayashi et al., 2002; Wallis and Miller, 2003; 
Kim et al., 2008) and striatum (Samejima et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2008) that 
participate in coding action value in parallel. Therefore, deactivating SEF would only 
weaken the overall action value representation within this network, rather than 
completely out take action value information. Currently, it is still not clear what the 
specific roles of DLPFC, caudate, and putamen are in coding action value. It is very 
possible that DLPFC and SEF interact cooperatively in transforming option into action-
value representation considering the reciprocally connection between them. Both DLPFC 
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and SEF project to FEF and SC, and share overlapping regions of the caudate (Huerta and 
Kaas, 1990; Wang et al., 2005). It is also possible that SEF may receive action value 
input information from DLPFC (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009). In order to test the 
possible interaction between SEF and DLPFC, it would be interesting to record these 
cortical areas simultaneously while perturbing the activity of one of them. This would 
allow testing the influence of activity in one area on activity in the other area. 
Although cooling did not completely eliminate rational choice behavior in our 
gambling task, the effect of the SEF inactivation as discussed is comparable to the effect 
of permanent lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex through ablation (Noonan et al., 2010). 
Overall, the fact that inactivation of SEF has an immediate effect on value-based 
decisions establishes a causal link between SEF single unit activity and choice based on 






Chapter 7  
General Discussion 
In previous chapters, we elucidated in detail on how our current findings are 
related to previous researches in specific aspects. In this chapter, we will discuss in 
general how value representation interacts with action selection during decision process, 
and how SEF might work in concert with other brain areas in value based decision-
making. 
7.1 Comparison between different value based decision- making 
hypotheses  
As discussed in chapter 1, currently there are two major hypotheses about value 
based decision-making (Cisek, 2012): the goods-based hypothesis and the action-based 
hypothesis.  
In the goods-based hypothesis, all the relevant decision factors can be integrated 
into a single variable capturing the subjective value of each offer. The decision is made in 
this subjective value representation and the option with the highest value is chosen. The 
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appropriate action plan then is computed to produce the requirement movement for the 
offer. Good-based hypothesis is more consistent with the traditional cognitive theories 
(Marr, 1982) which propose that "what to do " was selected before specifying "how to do 
it". Neurophysiological and imaging studies have suggested that the variables 
contributing to the decision in value space are encoded in the orbitofrontal cortex 
(Plassmann et al., 2007; Wallis, 2007; Padoa-Schioppa, 2011) and ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Kennerley and Walton, 2011). In 
orbitofrontal cortex, offer value neurons and chosen value neurons were found. The firing 
of offer value neuron has been identified to be linearly correlated with the subjective 
value of one of the offered rewards, regardless of what the other rewards are. Chosen 
value neuron has been shown to track the subjective value of the chosen reward in a 
single common currency independent of the juice type. Although the precise location for 
the occurrence of competition in the value space is still under debate (Padoa-Schioppa, 
2011), the existence of subjective value or expected utility provides a foundation of 
possible competition or choice selection in the value space. The good-based hypothesis in 
its pure form states that only action plan corresponding to the chosen target is represented 
in the motor related area. Moreover, there should be no competition between the two 
targets in the motor actions. The findings from this dissertation study argue against the 
goods-based hypothesis in its pure form for two reasons. First, SEF a motor related 
cortical area (Schlag and Schlag-Rey, 1987; Lynch and Tian, 2006) reflects both chosen 
and non-chosen targets in its action value map. Second, in addition to the competition in 
the value space, we also observed competition in the motor space with directional tuning. 
Therefore, though our result support value-based hypothesis in a general sense that 
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competition do occur in the value space, they argue against the good-based hypothesis in 
its pure form and its prediction of competition only presenting in the value space.  
Action-based hypothesis (Glimcher et al., 2005; Cisek, 2007; Rangel and Hare, 
2010) suggests that decision is made through biased competition between action 
representations. Thus, the other decision factors such as subjective value, effect of actions, 
only biases the competition process in action space, rather than directly competing with 
each other. The existence of action value related activity has challenged the good-based 
hypothesis. Numerous cortical regions have been found to code action value or are 
modulated by relative value information. These regions include the dosolateral prefrontal 
cortex (Leon and Shadlen, 1999; Kim et al., 2008), the anterior cingulate cortex (Shidara 
and Richmond, 2002; Seo and Lee, 2007), the lateral intraparietal area (Sugrue et al., 
2004; Louie and Glimcher, 2010), supplementary eye fields (Amador et al., 2000; So and 
Stuphorn, 2010), the superior colliculus (Ikeda and Hikosaka, 2003), and the striatum 
(Samejima et al., 2005; Lau and Glimcher, 2008). Chosen action value information was 
also found among these area including ACC (Kennerley and Wallis, 2009) and caudate 
(Lau and Glimcher, 2008). It is still under debate as to why option value and action value 
coexist in brain, and their functional specialties in value based decision process. The 
action-based hypothesis in its pure form would suggest that chosen action information 
appear earlier in brain than chosen value information. In contrary, our result argues 
against this hypothesis in its pure form. Our study shows that chosen value information or 
competition between value spaces occurs earlier than chosen direction information in 
motor space.  
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Based on these results, we propose a cascade hypothesis of decision-making. This 
hypothesis argues that competition in value space and action space happen simultaneous 
in time. The competition in the value space can bias the competition in the action space. 
In the current experiment paradigm, the competition in the action space was balanced at 
the beginning. Therefore, imbalances appear in the value space competition earlier than 
those in the action space.  This hypothesis is consistent with the hieratical control of the 
frontal lobe (Fuster, 2001; Badre, 2008; O'Reilly, 2010). It is very likely that good-based 
hypothesis and action-based hypothesis are two extreme cases of decision-making. For 
decision based on visual trigger, such as perceptual decision-making (Shadlen and 
Newsome, 2001) or in situation of unbalanced visual cues (Markowitz et al., 2011) as 
discussed in chapter 2, the competition occurs mainly in action space, and is very weak or 
equilibrated in value space. For the decision purely based on abstract component such 
subjective value which integrates different decision effectors in different contact, the 
competition is more likely to appear early in the value space than in the action space.  
7.2 The functional role of SEF in value based decision- making ----
executive control of saccade selection 
Decision-making and action selection are likely a distributed process that takes 
place within a larger network of areas, including SEF (Ledberg et al., 2007; Hernandez et 
al., 2010). As suggested by affordance hypothesis, the competition in the action space is 
likely to happen within an interconnected network of parietal and frontal areas, such as 
FEF and LIP (Cisek, 2007; Cisek and Kalaska, 2010), and sub-cortical areas (Gurney et 
al., 2001). This competition among the potential motor responses can be strongly 
influenced and controlled by executive signals depending on different cognitive demands. 
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This executive control signal can come from the prefrontal cortex and medial frontal 
cortex, including the SEF (Stuphorn and Schall, 2006; Isoda and Hikosaka, 2007; 
Johnston et al., 2007).  
Previous researches have shown that SEF does not directly participate in 
movement generation.  Similar to the neuronal activity in other medial frontal cortex 
(Scangos and Stuphorn, 2010), the neuronal activity in SEF also does not reach a fixed 
level of activity just before movement generation (Figure 4.4) (Schall et al., 2002; 
Stuphorn et al., 2010). SEF also does not show divisive normalization which is widely 
observed in many other motor related area, such as LIP (Louie et al., 2011), and SC 
(Basso and Wurtz, 1998). These facts support the notion that there is a fundamental 
difference in the functional role of SEF comparing to other oculomotor areas in motor 
control. In accordance with the idea that SEF participates in self-generated saccade 
movement, in this dissertation study, we found that SEF participates in coding action 
value based on internal representation of subjective value in the decision- making process. 
SEF can serve as a transition area bridging higher cognitive process within the value 
space and motor control in the action space. This is supported by the fact that the value 
information in SEF behave as if in between OFC and motor area. Unlike the neuronal 
activity in LIP or SC, SEF shows no divisive normalization in the neuronal representation. 
Therefore SEF can still faithfully represent the value in a monotonic way as OFC does. 
However, unlike the neuronal activity in OFC, the value signal in SEF has directional 
tuning and is also influenced by the value of other options. Therefore, it reflects the 
action value for each option and the mutual inhibition between them. The action value 
map in SEF can further provides a basic drive to bias the movement generation process in 
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downstream motor area as a form of executive control. Previous research found SEF 
influencing neuronal activity in oculomotor areas (Huerta and Kaas, 1990), such as FEF 
and SC, which directly control gaze (Hanes and Schall, 1996; Pare and Hanes, 2003). 
SEF’s influence on motor competition could be exerted either directly through 
connection with FEF and SC, or indirectly through projection to the caudate nucleus, 
with which it forms a cortical-basal ganglia loop. In order to test this executive control 
hypothesis, it would be very interesting to record simultaneously in SEF and FEF, and 
observe how stimulation or inactivation of SEF can influence the neuronal pattern in FEF.  
The inactivation experiment in this dissertation study further suggests a causal 
role of SEF in value based decision-making. Previous studies showed that in humans, 
lesions in SEF and SMA disrupt the automatic inhibitory control of motor plans that are 
evoked by external stimuli (Goldberg and Bloom, 1990; Sumner et al., 2007). Here, in 
our experiment paradigm, when inactivating the neuronal activity in SEF, the monkeys 
show less consistency and more randomness when making value based decisions. This 
inactivation is akin to taking out the executive control signal based on the value 
information, Although both monkeys could still make decision in a relatively rational 
way due to several possible reasons as discussed in section 6.3.2 , the magnitude of the 
SEF inactivation effect is comparable to the effect of permanent lesions of the 
orbitofrontal cortex through ablation (Noonan et al., 2010). 
7.3 Concluding remarks 
This dissertation study focuses on the neuronal mechanism underlying value 
based decision-making. Together with modeling, psychophysics research, 
neurophysiology recording, and perturbation technique, this study investigated the 
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functional role of SEF during value based decision making. Further it studied how value 
representation and action representation can interact with each other during the decision-
making process. Specifically, the pilot psychophysics research suggests how visual 
salience can influence the onset time of value representation and can influence action 
selection. After that, the main body of the research focused on neurophysiology recording 
in SEF, a value-action association area linking the value representation and motor control. 
The recording in SEF suggests that the action value information represented in SEF 
participate in choice selection process. The perturbation experiment produced further 
evidence supporting the causal role of SEF in value based decision-making. As an 
association area, SEF provides us a special opportunity in the study of the relation 
between value representation and action representation. Different from both of the 
currently prevalent theories of decision-making, we suggest a cascade hypothesis, in 
which competition occurs in both value space and motor space during value based 
decision-making. If the motor competition is balanced, such as in our experiment design, 
the imbalanced competition in value space which happens earlier can bias the 
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